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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENT ON APPEAL 
The Appellant proports the following issues are those pr imari ly ra ised 
in th is Appeal, 
1. That the "one action rule" as expressed in State Bank of Lehi v-
Ralph 0. Woolsev* 565 P.2d 413, (Utah, 1977), continues to be good law, 
2c That the application of the "one action rule11 r equ i res t h a t when a 
c red i to r invokes the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the Court seeking r e l i e f under a 
mortgage foreclosure statute (Utah Code Annotated Section 78-37-1 e t . seq*, 
1953 as amended) that the creditor must comply s t r i c t l y with the provis ions 
of said s ta tute , 
3« That s t r i c t compliance wi th t h e p r o v i s i o n s of the mortgage 
foreclosure s tatute includes but i s not limited tos 
A. A complaint seeking a mortgage foreclosure following a not ice 
of mortgage foreclosure; 
B. Acquisition of a judgment for an amount ce r t a in for i n t e r e s t 
accrued, existing principal obl iga t ions , for cos ts taxable t o 
the case, and for allowable at torney's fees; 
C. For an order of sale referencing the requirement t o f i r s t seek 
satisfaction of the judgment through the sa le of the secured 
real property by the conducting of a sher i f f ' s sale pursuant t o 
notice; 
D. The ac tua l conducting of a s h e r i f f ' s sa le following proper 
notice; and 
E. The running of a redemptive term with the opportunity of the 
-4 -
debtor to pay the amount bid and redeem his property saving h i s 
credit and property in the process . The credi tor /purchaser 
having the r i g h t concurrently t o p e t i t i o n the c o u r t for a 
deficiency judgment and to acquire a s h e r i f f ' s deed following 
running of the redemptive term. 
4. That the Defendant did not waive or agree t o give up through the 
s t i p u l a t i o n entered i n to and the judgment e n t e r e d a s a r e s u l t of t he 
stipulation his right to have s t r i c t compliance with the mortgage foreclosure 
statute including a requirement that a sale be conducted of the real property 
wherein he would have the opportunity to bid. Addit ionally there e x i s t s no 
waiver or agreement to forego the right to a statutory opportunity to redeem 
the mortgaged rea l property following the proper conducting of a sa le in 
s t r i c t adherence to the provisions of the mortgage foreclosure s t a t u t e . 
5. That the nature of the abuse that i s clearly evident in t h i s case , 
i . e . garnishment of the Defendant's bank account, garnishment of Defendant's 
attorney, execution or attempted execution and sa le of Defendant's r ea l and 
personal property, and an application for an increase in a t t o r n e y ' s fees and 
costs frcm $6,000.00 to $29,000.00 (approximately) are precise ly the kind of 
abuse t h a t the mortgage foreclosure s t a t u t e and the one ac t ion r u l e i s 
specifically designed to preclude, i . e . t ha t the Defendant may assume tha t 
the Plaintiffs wil l look f i r s t to the real property in a valid she r i f f ' s sa le 
and t h e r e a f t e r towards a d e f i c i e n c y judgment s h o u l d any a c c r u e . 
6. Further that the appeal has been brought timely and as the r e s u l t 
of a final order, said final order complying by designation of Judge Cornaby 
in conformity with his discretion, as a final appealable order and said f ina l 
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order complying with the substant ive requirements t h a t a f i na l order must 
dispose of a l l issues pertaining to the lawsuit, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In t h i s case a mortgage foreclosure ac t ion was i n s t i t u t e d by the 
Plaint iffs with a Complaint having been dated the 27th day of February 1986. 
The Second Jud ic i a l D i s t r i c t Court in and for Davis County, was asked in 
tha t Complaint spec i f i ca l ly t o invoke the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the Court for 
purposes of determining that a judicial sale may follow of the rea l property 
secured by a certain Trust Deed and that following said j u d i c i a l sa le t ha t a 
sheriff1 s deed may issue. Those words were su f f i c i en t t o invoke the r e l i e f 
of the Court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-37-1, 1953 as amended. 
(Trust Deeds being subject t o foreclosure as mortgages , see Utah Code 
Annotated Section 57-1-23, 1953 as amended.) 
Thereafter in the proceeding following the ac t ion of both p a r t i e s , a 
stipulation was entered into. The stipulation was dated the 3rd day of April 
1986, and was signed by Plaint i f fs ' and Defendant's counsel as well as the 
Defendant Mark Hall. A judgment was entered following the s t i p u l a t i o n and 
was dated the 29th day of Apri l 1986. The S t ipu la t ion contained on Page 
3, Paragraph 5(a) the words "that the subject property of t h i s ac t ion w i l l 
be foreclosed and t i t l e to said property wil l be transferred to and vested in 
the P l a in t i f f s . 8 1 The Judgment on Page 2 thereof, paragraph number one, 
contained in pa r t the following words " tha t the subject property in t h i s 
action i s hereby foreclosed with respect to any interest claimed by Defendant 
Mark Hall or any party claiming any by or through him and said t i t l e to said 
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property i s transferred to and vested in the P l a i n t i f f s subject only t o the 
easement and rights-of-way of record as of January 7, 1986." The St ipula t ion 
and Judgment a l so contained language which granted judgment against the 
Defendant Mark Hall, The language in the St ipula t ion was contained on Page 
3, paragraph 5(b) f (c) and (d), providing as follows: 
"That judgment will be granted against Mark Hall in favor 
of Plaintiffs for an amount equal to interest accrued on 
$450,000.00 from January 7, 1986, un t i l March _^ _ 1986. 
That judgment wil l be granted against Defendant and in 
favor of Plaintiffs for a l l costs incurred by P l a i n t i f f s 
due to Defendant's default including but not l imited t o , 
the foreclosure repor t , cost of se rv ice , property tax 
past due, recording fees , e t c . That judgment w i l l be 
granted against Defendant and in favor of P la in t i f f s for 
Plaint i f fs ' reasonable a t t o rney ' s fees from January 6, 
1986, unti l judgment i s entered hereon.11 
The Judgment contained language granting a monetary judgment against Mark 
Hall on page two, paragraphs 2, 3 , 4, and 5. That language i s as follows: 
"2. That judgment i s entered againt Defendant Mark Hall 
in favor of Plaintiffs for an amount equal t o i n t e r e s t 
accrued at the rate of 21% per annum on $45,000 or $258.90 
per day from January 7, 1986, unt i l judgment i s entered 
herein, for a total prejudgment in te res t of $28,966.90. 
3. That judgment i s entered against Defendant Mark Hall 
in favor of P l a i n t i f f s for an amount equal t o c o s t s 
incurred by Plaintiffs in relation to th is action in the 
amount of $453.08. 
4. That judgment i s entered against Defendant Mark Hall 
in favor of Plaintiffs for an amount equal to Plaint i ffs ' 
reasonable attorney's fees incurred in r e l a t i o n t o t h i s 
ac t ion in the amount of $6,635.00; t h i s sum may be 
increased frcm time to time as proven by Affidavit of 
Plaint i ffs ' counsel and approved by th is Court, in order 
to effect collection on th i s judgment or any part thereof. 
5. That judgment be entered against Defendant Mark Hall 
in favor of Plaintiffs for an amount equal to the r en t s 
collected by Defendant or Defendant1 s agents during the 
month of February 1986, which amount i s $8,000.00. 
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Said judgment including a l l the above amounts sha l l be 
reduced by the net receipts deposited in the Trust Account 
of Daniel W. Marcum under paragraph 3 and 6 of t he 
aforenentioned stipulation and under the previsions of the 
Court1 s Order Appointing a Receiver dated February 28, 
1986f for a total amount of the reduction being $12,376.05* 
Judgment, therefore, i s granted against Mark Hall and in 
favor of Plaintiffs in the total dollar amount of $31,708*93
 e
lf 
Following the entry of the Judgment and S t ipu la t ion with the language 
shewn, no further action of any character r e l a t i v e to the conducting of a 
s h e r i f f ' s sa le was undertaken, there was no not ice of sa le and no s a l e 
conducted, there was no waiver of redemptive r ights in the Stipulation or the 
Judgment and the next action undertaken by the Plaint iffs was a garnishing of 
Defendant's bank account and the bringing of an action in the Fourth J u d i c i a l 
Distr ict Court in and for Utah County, State of Utah, to se t as ide t r ans f e r s 
and conveyances made by the Defendant to third persons in order to allow the 
Plaint iffs to execute against those properties for purposes of sat isfying the 
Judgment referenced above, 
I , as counsel for the Defendant Mark Hall, then entered an Appearance in 
the Fourth Distr ic t and in the Second Distr ic t and made the following motions: 
I submitted an Affidavit of Counsel, a Motion for Sanctions and Fees, a Motion 
for an Accounting of the Receiver, a Motion to Set Aside the Appointment of a 
Receiver, Motion to Vacate the Supplemental Order and a Motion to Compel an 
Order of Sale, submitting therewith a Memoranda of Facts and Arguments in 
support of my Motions* The bas ic nature of the argument contained in the 
Memoranda was that the one action ru l e required t h a t an obl iga t ion secured 
solely by a mortgage on real property can only be brought in the form of one 
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action, that being a mortgage foreclosure in conformity with the mortgage 
foreclosure statutes of the State of Utah. Further , t ha t the supplemental 
proceedings, the garnishments, the actions in the Fourth Judicial D i s t r i c t t o 
set aside the transfers and to execute upon real property were a l l voidable . 
Also, t h a t the "One Action Rule" requ i red s t r i c t compliance wi th the 
s ta tu to ry language and tha t a s h e r i f f ' s sa le must be conducted with the 
subsequent right of redemption. That a t the time of the s h e r i f f ' s sa l e the 
amount of judgment may be bid and that the Defendant would thereafter have the 
opportunity of paying the amount bid a t the time of the sale and redeeming the 
real property in conformity with the mortgage foreclosure s t a t u t e s . These 
motions were taken under advisement having been heard and argued e s s e n t i a l l y 
on two occasions and were subsequently denied. I t h e r e a f t e r f i l e d an 
Objection to an Order Appointing a Receiver on another piece of property 
located in Utah County t ha t was the subject matter of the Fourth J u d i c i a l 
D i s t r i c t Court ac t ion , a Motion for a Protec t ive Order and a Motion for 
Reconsideration of the rulings on the prior motions. These matters were heard 
by Judge Cornaby at the Second Judicial District Court in and for Davis County 
and Judge Cornaby1 s ruling on the motions resulted, the ruling on the motions 
in essence deny Mr. Marcum, counsel for the P l a i n t i f f s , the opportunity of 
appointing a receiver on the collateral property without subsequent hearings 
but denies the Defendant's motion t o force an order of sa le and denies the 
Defendant a right of redemption in the original mortgage foreclosure in the 
Second Judicial District Court. 
The Plaintiffs thereafter sought to garnish Defendant's a t torney for 
purposes of sa t i s fy ing t h e i r money judgment and by proposed order of the 
- 9 -
appointment of a receiver as a r e s u l t of the f i r s t ru l ing on the motions 
sought to allow the receiver to sel l real property al leged to belong t o the 
Defendant located in Utah County to apply towards t h e money judgment 
referenced in the judgment acquired by the P l a i n t i f f s aga ins t the Defendant 
Mark Hall. Since that point in time there has been an app l ica t ion by the 
Plaintiffs1 counsel to increase frcm approximately $6,000.00 to approximately 
$29,000.00 the amount of cos t s and a t t o r n e y ' s fees which would therefore 
raise frcm approximately $31,000.00 to approximately $54,000.00 the amount of 
the judgment sought in t o t a l by the P l a i n t i f f s a g a i n s t t h e Defendant . 
The Ruling on the Motions resulted in an Order of the Court confirming 
the Judge ' s memorandum decis ion. The Judge ' s f i na l memorandum decis ion 
states "counsel for the Defendant has asked the Court t o inform him the day 
the appeal time begins. Today i s t h a t day." And t h a t f ina l memorandum 
decision was dated December 12, 1986, and signed by Judge Cornaby. An Order 
was prepared in conformity with t h a t memorandum decis ion as indicated and 
that Order was submitted to the Court after the 18th day of December of 1986 
but s ta tes in the Order, paragraph numbered seven on page four, "the time 
period allowed for the Defendant to appeal th is Court's decis ion to deny h i s 
Motion to Compel Sale, to Vacate Supplemental Order, to Set Aside Appointment 
of Receiver, for Accounting of Receiver, and for Sanctions and Fees, began 
running on the date th i s Court's ru l ing was rendered, namely, December 12, 
1986." 
I t i s frcm these f ac t s and circumstances t h a t t h i s Appeal i s taken. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
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The Appellant respec t fu l ly submits t h a t a mortgage f o r e c l o s u r e 
proceeding was begun by the Backstrom Family Limited Par tnership in t h e i r 
action against Mark Hall and t h a t the One Action Rule i s the ru le of law 
governing the a c t s and ac t ions of those pe r sons seeking t o f o r e c l o s e 
mortgages or t rust deeds as mortgages within the jurisdiction of the Sta te of 
Utah, The Appellant fur ther argues t h a t the S t ipu la t ion and Judgment of 
April 1986, are instruments which define the r e l a t i v e pos i t ion , r i gh t s and 
responsibil i t ies of the part ies to the extent t ha t they address the i ssues 
presented but that the Defendant/Appellant did not waive or have reason t o 
believe that he had waived h i s r igh t t o a t tend a sa le of the foreclosure 
property, did not waive or have reason t o bel ieve t h a t he had waived the 
protection of the One Action Rule relative to the question of the acquis i t ion 
of a personal judgment and did not waive or have reason to bel ieve t ha t he 
had waived the right to redeem the rea l property foreclosed as a mortgage. 
The Appellant respectfully submits t h a t the judgment of April 1986, should 
have but did not include an order of sale but did include a judgment for a 
foreclosure amount which amount should have se t the maximum bidable a t the 
time of sale by the Plaint i ffs /Respondents and t ha t following a s a l e a 
redemption period should have run granting the Appellant the r i gh t to redeem 
therein and that unti l such time as the sa le was conducted the redemption 
period had terminated and a sheriff f s deed had issued t h a t the foreclosure 
was incomplete, t ha t there was no f i n a l i t y and t ha t a l l i s sues are s t i l l 
subject to the jurisdiction of the Second Dis t r i c t Court subject to review, 
subject to final orders, subject to additional d i r ec t ion and subject yet t o 
an opportunity to appeal upon the receipt of a final order or f ina l judgment 
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at the time that Judge Cornaby determined that all issues had been decided 
and all direction had been given that was required or that was going to be 
given by him in his courtroom* 
Hie Appellant respectfully submits that he is entitled to the use, 
possession and rents of the property in conformity with State Bank of Lehi, 
supra, until such time as a sale terminates his legal title and that he is 
entitled to the use and possession of the property and credits for the rent 
against a redemption if he has not the use and possession of the property 
during the redemptive term as set forth in Rule 69(f) (6) Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 
The Appellant respectfully submits that Judge Cornaby was most capable 
of determining and had discretion to determine when a final order or final 
judgment had or had not been issued and made that determination in his Ruling 
on the Motions dated the 12th day of December 1986, covered by the Order 
signed sometime after the 18th day of December 1986. That Judge Cornaby 
making the determination that this would be a final order was appropriate 
witin his authority and discretion and was within the parameters set by the 
case law determined by a number of sister jurisdictions in that finality, a 
termination of direction, and an appropriate stage of the proceedings had 
been readied. 
POINT I 
THE ONE ACTION RULE IS THE EXISTING STANDARD OF LAW 
RELATIVE TO PDRTSA3E FORECLOSURES IN TOE STATE OF UTAH 
The "One Action Rule" s t a t e s t h a t when an ob l iga t ion i s secured s o l e l y 
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by a mortgage upon real property that there can be only one action for the 
recovery of any debt or the enforcement of any right and that action must be 
in accordance with the provisions of the mortgage foreclosure law as set 
forth in Utah Code Annotated Section 78-37-1 et. seq. 1953 as amended. The 
"One Action Rule" has a long and solid history as represented by the cases 
reviewed by the Supreme Court in this jurisdiction as evidenced by the case 
of Boucofski ,v. ;Jacobsen» 36 Utah 165, 104 P. 117, (Utah, 1909). Therein 
the Utah Supreme Court at Page 122 states? 
"Under statutes similar to the foregoing the Supreme Court 
c£ California has frequently held that there is no personal 
liabiity upon the part of the mortgagor except after a sale 
of the mortgaged property, and then only for any deficiency 
remaining after the proceeds of the sale have been applied 
to the discharge cf the debt. And, further that the personal 
liability of the mortgagor can not, without his consent, 
be enforced until after the sale, and for the deficiency 
only." 
The Utah Supreme Court then cited numerous California cases in support of that 
proposition and then in the successive paragraph at Page 122 stated: "This 
Court in an early case has also recognized the doctrine that there is but one 
action permitted for the recovery of a debt secured by mortgage." The Supreme 
Court in Boucofski * supra, found that a secured party cannot seek a personal 
judgment but must foreclose the real property securing the debt as a mortgage. 
It is interesting to note that at Page 119 in the Boucofski. supra, case the 
Court in the second paragraph of its decision states "before proceeding to the 
merits we are required to pass upon a motion to dismiss the appeal, upon the 
alleged ground that it was not taken within six months from the entry of 
judgment." And further in that paragraph states "it is contended that, while 
the question whether additional findings and conclusions of law should be made 
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or not was pendingf the judgment was subject to be changed by the Court and 
hence not a final or appealable judgment." There having been arguments by the 
Respondent that the appeal was not timely filed on the basis that a final 
judgment had been entered and that amendments to that final judgment and to 
findings of fact and conclusions of law did not toll the operation of the 
period of time set for presentation of an appeal. The Court entered into a 
lengthy discussion concerning legislative action that took place during this 
period of time but essentially determined that the Court had continuing 
jurisdiction over issues central to the case following the entry of the 
judgment and while those issues had been timely raised and were being argued 
that the running of the appeal term would not take place. (A detailed 
analysis of the question of final judgment and the beginning of the term for 
appeal will appear at the end of these arguments.) 
In the case of Hammond v. wall, 51 Utah 464, 171 P. 148, (1918), the 
Utah Supreme Court determined that a creditor could not seek recovery against 
other assets of a debtor in instances where the creditor was secured by a 
mortgage on real property without first looking to the foreclosure of the real 
property to satisfy the debt. In the case of First National Bank of 
Coalville ,y» Boley, 90 Utah 341, 344, 61 P.2d 621, (1936), the Utah Supreme 
Court found that a creditor must first have exhausted all of the value and the 
quantity of any existing real property secured by a mortgage before seeking 
additional recovery from any other assets of a debtor. In the First National 
Bank of Coalville> supra, case the Court states on Page 622, Paragraph 
numbered One "the judgment entered by the clerk was a personal judgment. It 
was a judgment upon which execution could have been issued and the property of 
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the Defendants, whether included in the mortgage or not attached thereunder." 
. . . The Court goes on to say on Page 622: 
"There can be but one action for the recovery of any debt 
or the enforcement of any right secured by mortgage upon 
real estate or personal property, which action must be in 
accordance with the provisions of this chapter. Judgment 
shall be given adjudging the amount due, with costs and 
disbursements, and the sale of the mortgaged property, or 
some part thereof, to satisfy said amount and accruing 
costs, and directing the sheriff to proceed and sell the 
same according to the provisions of law relating to sales 
on execution, and a special execution or order of sale 
shall be issued for that purpose.11 
"If it appears frcm the return of the officer making the 
sale that the proceeds are insufficient and a balance still 
remains due, judgment therefore must then be docketed by 
the clerk and execution may be issued for such balance as 
in other cases; but no general execution shall issues until 
after the sale of the mortgaged property and the application 
of the amount realized as aforesaid." 
That discussion and reading of the existing law of the Supreme Court 
preceded the paragraph on Page 623 that stated "we have held that under these 
sections there is no personal liability by the mortgagor until after a 
foreclosure sale of the security, and then only for the deficiency remaining 
unpaid, and that a mortgagee may not have a personal judgment against a 
mortgagor until the security has been first exhausted." The Supreme Court in 
the First National Bank of .Coalville* supra, case then went on to discuss the 
invalidity of the judgment entered by the clerk. That invalidity was 
predicated upon the fact that there could not be a personal judgment entered 
in a case where there was a security by a mortgage on real property until 
after there had been a sale and a deficiency assessed as the result of that 
sale. That is remarkably similar to the nature of the circumstances that we 
find ourselves in, in the case at bar. In fact the Appellant Court should 
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recognize that the Plaintiffs/Respondents filed an action in the Fourth 
District Court in and for Utah County to recover on their "personal judgment" 
against other real property they claimed belonged to the Appellant Mark Hall, 
souc#it to garnish his bank account, garnish his counselfs fees, and take 
other actions for recovery of their "personal judgment"* 
It would be timely for those reviewing this brief to new carefully read 
the Stipulation and Judgment entered as a result of said Stipulation both of 
which arose in April 1986, Mr, Mar cum, counsel for the Plaintiffs/Respondents, 
has argued previously that the Stipulation terminated the mortgage foreclosure 
proceeding, terminated the responsibility of the Plaintiffs to adhere to the 
statutory responsibilities set forth in a mortgage foreclosure proceeding and 
granted a personal judgment in addition to a return of the real property that 
had been subject to the mortgage foreclosure proceeding* Neither the 
Stipulation nor the Judgment entered as a result thereof, contain any language 
specifically waiving any rights of Mark Hall or specifically waiving any 
responsibilities of the Backstrcm Family relative to the question of adhering 
to the mortgage foreclosure statute, acquiring an order of sale, conducting a 
sale, allowing an opportunity to bid, allowing the opportunity of redemption 
following the bid, and acquiring a sheriff1 s deed upon the expiration of the 
redemptive term. The case of U»S« v- Loosley- 551 P.2d 506 (Utah 1976), 
stands for the proposition that rules and statutes deaLing with redemption of 
real property are regarded as remedial in nature and that the rules and 
statutes should be given liberal construction and application to permit the 
property owner who can pay his debts and obligations to do so for purposes of 
making the creditor whole and allowing the debtor the opportunity of saving 
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his property, 
I have I feel gotten ahead of myself f however f t h e r e a r e a few 
additional cases of considerable import to discuss concerning the mortgage 
foreclosure elements of th i s Appeal. 
The case of Bank of Bphriam v. Davis* 581 P.2d 1001 (Utah 1978), 
stands for the specific concept that personal l i a b i l i t y may be imposed on a 
mortgagor only after the sale of mortgaged property has been ordered and a 
deficiency appears following said sale . 
In Stewart .Livestock Company v,- Ostler, 105 Utah 529, 144 P.2d 276, 
(1943), the Supreme Court provided us with the judicial determination tha t a 
foreclosure decree must spec i fy t h e amount due i n c l u d i n g c o s t s and 
disbursements. In our casef the Judgment even though i t doesn't call i t se l f a 
foreclosure decree does bespeak of an amount due in our case a t bar and does 
describe the nature of the i n t e r e s t accruing, the a t t o r n e y ' s fees and the 
principal obligation as would be provided in a standard mortgage foreclosure 
judgment. The only thing that the Judgment of April 1986f in the case a t bar 
fa i l s to provide i s for an order of sa le in conformity with the prayer for 
relief of the Canplaint or in conformity with the requirements of the mortgage 
foreclosure s tatute . 
Perhaps the most important case of recent vintage r e l a t i v e to t h e 
question of mortgage foreclosures reviewed by the Supreme Court of the Sta te 
of Utah i s that case of the State Bank of Lehi v . Ralph Q. Woolsey. 565 P. 2d 
413, (Utah, 1977), wherein the Utah Supreme Court a t Page 415 presents the 
concept that relief granted to a mortgagee in equity i s the enforcement of his 
equitable l ien by the sale of the mortgaged premises and by the application of 
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the proceeds of that sale upon the debt owed by the mortgagor to the 
mortgagee. This concept is presented in such a fashion that one can only 
interpret the Supreme Gourt to mean that the only relief that can be granted 
to a creditor in a mortgage foreclosure action is through the enforcement of a 
mortgage foreclosure and sale of the premises secured by said mortgage. 
Interestingly the Supreme Court in the State Bank of Lehi* supra, case at 
Page 415 and 416 states: 
"The mortgagor's estate is, in effect transferred to the 
purchaser at the judicial sale. A legal estate is taken 
fron the mortgagor and transferred to the purchaser. The 
mortgagee may buy the land at the sale and thus acquire the 
title, but he acquires it as a purchaser and not as mortgagee. 
The mortgagor retains the full legal estate, subject only to 
the encumberance, and is entitled to the possession, use, 
rents, and profits up to the time when its title is finally 
divested by a judicial sale in a proceeding to enforce the 
lien.1' 
In our case at bar there has been no sale and it is the proposition of the 
Appellant that the Appellant retains now the full legal estate subject only to 
the underlying encumberance and is entitled to the possession, use, rents, and 
profits of that estate until a sale is actually conducted and accordingly is 
entitled to an accounting frcm the receiver appointed in the Second District 
and a return of all proceeds accruing as a result of the rents and uses of the 
property until the legal estate is taken from him by the Backstrom Family 
Partnership conducting a sale in conformity with legal requirements of the 
statute. The Court goes on to say on Page 416 "that in order to determine if 
a mortgagee is entitled to the relief sought, it is absolutely necessary to 
determine there is a debt secured by a mortgage." In our case the pleadings 
specifically invoke the jurisdiction of the Court pleading that in fact a 
mortgage exists and to that plea the Defendant/Appellant acquiesces. At Page 
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416 the Utah Supreme Court in the State Bank of Lehi^ supra, further says 
"• • • in a foreclosure proceeding, the mortgagee's right to a money judgment 
i s not a separate matter but a prerequisite to the equitable relief demanded," 
In essence the Supreme Court i s saying t ha t i t i s impossible t o acquire a 
personal money judgment in a foreclosure proceeding, one can only acquire a 
judgment against which the value of the real property i s applied a t the time 
of the sale and thereafter a deficiency may accrue. That p r inc ipa l of law 
discussed in the Sta te Bank of Lehi* supra, r e l a t i v e t o the question of 
possession, use, rents and profi ts i s law also that i s well es tab l i shed . In 
the case of Local .Realty Xtannaany ,v» ^Lindquist. 85 P.2d 770 (Utah, 1938), 
the Utah Supreme Court on Page 770 states "this action presents the quest ion: 
i s the owner/mortgagor who i s in actual possession of r ea l e s t a t e from the 
time of sa le under mortgage foreclosure to expi ra t ion of the redemption 
period, - when he does not redeem, - l iable to the mortgagee-purchaser a t the 
sale for the rental value of the premises during the redemption per iod ." To 
th is question the Supreme Court offers a resounding NO. At Page 772 of the 
case the Supreme Court s ta tes " i t i s self evident that the purchaser (at the 
time of a sheriff ' s sale) does not have a l l the right or t i t l e of the judgment 
debtor until redemption has expired. The r i g h t of possession i s one the 
judgment debtor has a t the time of sale and tha t r i gh t remains in him u n t i l 
the execution of the sher i f f ' s deed." That rule of law yet remains the same 
as evidenced by the specif ic language in the Sta te Bank,of Lehi- supra. 
The Appellant proports that the Suprene Court upon finding t h a t there 
has been a failure by the Plaintiffs/Respondents t o adhere to the mortgage 
foreclosure statute should d i r ec t t h a t an accounting and reimbursement of 
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funds be given the Defendant /Appel lant and t h a t use and p o s s e s s i o n of t h e 
premises be returned t o t h e Defendan t /Appe l lan t u n t i l such t ime a s a s a l e 
terminates t h e r e l e g a l t i t l e and f u r t h e r f i n d t h a t use and p o s s e s s i o n i n 
conformity with the Rule 69 of the Rules of Civi l Procedure remains w i th t h e 
m o r t g a g o r u n t i l t h e e x p i r a t i o n of t h e p e r i o d of r e d e m p t i o n * 
Rule 69(f) (6) , Utah Rules of Civi l Procedure, p r o v i d e s t h a t "when any 
ren t s or p r o f i t s have been received by the judgment c r e d i t o r or purchase r or 
h i s or her ass igns from the property thus sold preceding such redemption t h e 
amounts of such ren t s and p r o f i t s sha l l be a c r e d i t upon the redemption money 
to be paid?" in t h i s case t he Appe l l an t should be given c r e d i t s t h e r e f o r e 
against the purchase pr ice due under t h e o r i g i n a l c o n t r a c t , t r u s t deed and 
t r u s t (feed note being foreclosed, for a l l monies col lec ted by the Respondents 
from the date of t h e i r possession of the property u n t i l t h e t ime of s a l e for 
t he i r own use and benef i t s and further be given c r e d i t aga ins t the redemption 
p r i c e for a l l r e n t s and monies a c q u i r e d between t h e d a t e t h a t t h e s a l e 
ac tua l ly takes place and the e x p i r a t i o n of the p e r i o d of redemption i n t h e 
event t h a t the Appellant redeems the property* 
POINT I I 
THAT THE ORDER SIGNED BY JUDGE COENABY ON OR AFTER THE 
lfflH DAY OF DECEMBER 1986, PRODUCED IN CONFORMITY WITH 
THE DOCUMENT ENTITLED RDLIN3 ON THE MOTIONS SIGNED BY 
JUDGE OORNABY ON THE 12TO DAY OF DECEMBER 1986, IS A 
FINAL JUDGMENT APPEALABLE UNDER THE LMS OF THE STATE 
OF UTAH. 
The Supreme Court of t h e S t a t e of Oregon has i n a couple of c a s e s 
s t a t ed succinct ly the nature of and reasons for r e s t r i c t i n g a p p e a l s t o f i n a l 
judgments. The Supreme Court of the S ta te of Oregon has i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e 
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systems for appeals would fa i l to function efficiently if required to decide 
while l i t iga t ion i s s t i l l pending an inf ini te variety of questions concerning 
the process of l i t i g a t i o n and h i s indicated t h a t orders a re simply not 
appealable un t i l the controversy i s completed and f i na l l y s e t t l e d in the 
t r i a l court. See Doulhy ,v» Simpson Timber Company, 431 P.2d 846, (Oregon 
1967) and Hoy v. Jackson. 554 P.2d 561, (Oregon App 1976). 
In our case the Judgment i s s u e d i n Apr i l of 1986 fo l lowing t h e 
Stipulation entered into by the part ies provided for a foreclosure but did not 
state whether a foreclosure sale was to take place or not take place . The 
Defendant/Appellant Mark Hall did and was ent i t led to assume that a s h e r i f f ' s 
sa le would take place and t h a t following a s h e r i f f ' s s a l e a pe r iod of 
redemption would e x i s t . Even though possession was in the hands of the 
Plantiff s/Respondents and even though the Judgment s tates that the property i s 
hereby foreclosed and tha t the property i s t ransfer red and vested in the 
Plaintiffs the Judgment doesn't actually state t h a t possession should be in 
the P la in t i f f ' s hands from that point forward and the S t ipu la t ion offers no 
assistance relat ive to the question of possession. Should the Court presume 
that the Plaintiffs/Respondents were ent i t led to possession during th is period 
of time or as a result of any potential inferences in the Stipulation or Order 
the Supreme Court of the State of Arizona has concluded tha t orders r e l a t i v e 
to questions of immediate possession are not necessar i ly f ina l judgments 
merely because they grant possession immediately but rather that other issues f 
so long as they exist within the case and are being heard by the Court and are 
subject to a determination of r ights , r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and benef i t s of the 
part ies l e f t the case in a status where there exis ted no "f inal judgment". 
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Generally these cases are condemnation proceedings as in the case of Rogers 
v. Salt River .Project Agricultural . . Improvement and Pow^r D i s t r i c t . 517 
P.2d 1275, (Arizona, 1974) . In the case of Proper t ies Inv, En te rp r i s e s . 
.IiBBitWl V* FQTOfefriQtl f Qff Afcgi?Qgn Relief KlCi t 563 P<,2d 307, (Arizona App. 
1977), the Arizona Supreme Court s ta tes that the "name given s judgment1 does 
not determine i t s f inal i ty for purposes of appeal but trather i t s substance or 
effect." 
Further, the California Suprene Court in Parr .v. Yellow Cab .Company. 
433 P.2d 732 (California 1967), the Court offers the proposi t ion t ha t when 
one wishes to make a determination as to whether a final judgment within the 
meaning of s ta tute for purposes of appeal does or does not e x i s t , t ha t the 
rule i s that the question effecting the r i g h t of appeal i s not the form of 
the order or judgment but ra ther the ru le concerns i t s e l f with the l ega l 
effect of such an order or judgment. In other words the Court in reviewing 
the determination as to whether or not a f inal judgment e x i s t s for purposes 
of appeal must look a t the t o t a l substance of the order to make such a 
determination and not merely what the instrument i s ca l led be t h a t order or 
judgment. 
The Colorado Court of Appeals has discussed t h i s issue in the case of 
Trans Cent Airlines Inc^ v> Peter J . McBreen~&*Associaties Inc-r 497 P.2d 
1033 (Colorado App. 1972). Therein the Colorado Appeals Court suggested t h a t 
under Rule 54(b) of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure the t r i a l court not 
the part ies or their counsel was to make the determination as to the f i n a l i t y 
of an order for purposes of appeal. The Suprene Court of the State of Hawaii 
in Monette v„ Benjamin * 467 P.2d 574 (Hawaii 1970), indicated that the l a s t 
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decision rendered in a case i s not necessarily the f i na l judgment in a case 
but that the effect of the decision and the nature of the decision and the 
stage a t which the decision i s rendered i s the true t es t of determining when 
a f inal judgment ex is t s . 
In Cusintz v* ,Cusintz. 404 P.2d 164, (Kansas 1965) , t h e Kansas 
Supreme Court indicated that the final order that i s appealable i s one which 
finally decides and disposes of the e n t i r e mer i t s of the controversy and 
reserves no further questions or d i r ec t ions for further considerat ion and 
requires no further action of the court. I t i s Appellant's pos i t ion t h a t i f 
th i s rule were applied to the case presently under appeal here that one would 
see that Mark Hall the Appellant herein was enti t led to presume t h a t further 
ac t ion would be necess i t a ted , i . e . an order of sa le and t ha t where t he 
further action did not take place t h a t further act ion was necessary i . e . a 
request for an order of sale and a demand for an opportunity to bid, t o have 
a sale, to redeem, to save one's property. The Kansas Supreme Court again 
addressed the question in Connell ,v. .State Highway Commission« 388 P.2d 637 
(Kansas 1964) wherein the court indicated the word " f ina l" as used in the 
statutes of the State of Kansas regarding the invocation of j u r i s d i c t i o n for 
the appellate courts i s to be given i t s ordinary meaning, and that essentially 
means that any judgment or order i s a f inal judgment or order if a l l issues in 
the case are determined by that judgment or order. 
I t should be noted t h a t we a r e not a p p e a l i n g the judgment of 
foreclosure but appealing the lack of the procedurial follow through required 
by the Respondents to effect the finalization of the foreclosure of the r ea l 
property and appealing the orders of the Dis t r ic t Court t h a t do not require 
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the Backstrcms to conduct a sale, have bids, allow a redemptive term to run, 
and perform those a c t s p r i o r t o a c q u i r i n g an> p e r s o n a l judgment and 
attempting to execute on a deficiency. The Appellant i s suggesting t h a t the 
judgment of t he Second D i s t r i c t Court i n f a i l i n g t o e n f o r c e t h a t 
responsibility was in error and that judgment of the court has expressed in 
the order s t a t ing t h a t time for appeal ran from December 12, 1986, was a 
final judgment appealable to the Supreme Court because i t terminated and made 
a final determination of a l l i s sues and ques t ions and allowed no fur ther 
action in the Distr ict Court. 
In the S ta te of Kansas an order of confirmation i s r e q u i r e d i n a 
foreclosure proceeding and in the EtfCefa* Federal Savings & Um\ &?gQ<?i9U9n 
v. Long, 380 P.2d 439 (Kansas 1963) case the Kansas Supreme Court indicated 
that in a mortgage foreclosure action on real property when the property i s 
sold and the sa le confirmed t h a t the confirmation i s ra i sed jud ica ta and 
becomes final and binding ( i . e . a f inal judgment of the court) subject only 
to the right of appeal. In the State of Utah we do not have a respons ib i l i ty 
to acquire a confirmation of the sale but an order of sale i s required and a 
sa le r e s u l t i n g in u l t imate ly a s h e r i f f 1 s deed f i n a l i z e s the foreclosure 
proeeding subject only to the r i gh t of redemption where those a c t s do not 
take place they would be contested l o g i c a l l y and t h a t contest subject t o 
review by the appe l la te court system of t h i s j u r i s d i c t i o n . For ins tance 
Speckner v.. Riebold, 523 P.2d 10, (New Mexico 1974) , s t a n d s for t h e 
proposition that portion of a decree of foreclosure which d i r e c t s the manner 
and terms of the sale of mortgaged property does not become a f i na l judgment 
unti l the judicial confirmation of the sale. In other words the instrument 
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i t se l f doesn't beccme a f inal judgment unti l a l l acts have been completed in 
the State of Utah the completion of those acts include a sale, the running of 
a redemptive term and the issuance of sheriff 's deed. 
As a footnote to the concept of f i n a l i t y the Utah Supreme Court has 
issued an interesting decision in the case of Downey State Bank v- Mai or ~ 
Blakenev Corporation, 556 P.2d 1273f s t a ted the re in e s s e n t i a l l y where 
attorney's fees were granted in a foreclosure decree should t h a t foreclosure 
decree be affirmed on appeal the t r i a l court can not than subsequently allow 
additional attorney's fees for services rendered in res i s t ing the appeal and 
thereupon enter a supplemental judgment whereby the additional amount allowed 
i s incorporated in and becomes par t of the o r i g i n a l decree s i nce the 
provisions of the mortgage become merged in the decree which governs the 
rights of the part ies where the decree contains no provisions for add i t iona l 
attorney's fees, then addi t ional a t t o r n e y ' s fees can not be allowed. The 
judgment in t h i s case did s t a t e in the fourth paragraph " th i s sum may be 
increased frcm time to time as proven by affidavit of P la in t i f f ' s counsel and 
approved by this court, in order to effect collection on th i s judgment or any 
part thereof." But i t i s the proposition of the Appellant t h a t open ended 
an unlimited opportunity i s both unconscionable and unsupported by the terms 
and conditions of the contract and unenforceable by the D i s t r i c t Court and 
should be so ordered by th is Appeals Court. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion the Appellant submits that there i s no evidence tha t the 
Plaintiffs in the Dis t r ic t Court were not pursuing a mortgage foreclosure 
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action and that they were not required to complete the mortgage foreclosure 
action in s t r i c t conformity with the statute and the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the 
same as given by the Supreme Court of the S ta te of Utah. The Appellant 
p r o p o r t s t h a t t h e Respondents d id no t adhere t o t h e i r p r o c e d u r i a l 
responsibil i t ies, that an order of sale was required, t ha t a sa le must have 
been conducted, t h a t a period of redemption must have followed wi th an 
opportunity of the judgment debtor to repurchase for the amount bid a t the 
time of sale which amount must have been no more than tha t se t by the Court 
as the judgment amount ava i l ab le in the foreclosure proceeding. That no 
increase in at torney's fees are available, that the Court of Appeals should 
direct the Distr ict Court of Davis County to order a Scale, to grant judgment 
in conformity with the judgment amount given in Apri l 1986, t o requi re t h a t 
the Appellant bids no more than the sum of the Judgment granted in April 1986 
and essentially that the procedures established as se t for th in the Sta te 
Bank of Lehi, supra, be adhered to i . e . that the mortgagor r e t a i n the f u l l 
l ega l e s t a t e subject only to the encumberance and be e n t i t l e d t o t h e 
possession, use, rents and profi ts of that estate unti l such time as t i t l e i s 
finally divested by a judicial sale in a proceeding t o enforce the l i e n and 
that no money judgment be adjudged separate and d i s t i n c t from the property 
unti l such time as a deficiency a r i s e s following a bid a t the time of sa le 
and a fai lure to redeem and that Mark Hall the Appellant herein be granted 
judgment against the Respondents for those sums they have taken from him by 
wrongfully depriving him of the use, possession and r en t s of h i s proper ty . 
For such other and further relief as th is Court deems j u s t and equi table we 
respectfully submit these arguments. 
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DATED this ,' . day of ?<VN->,,., , 1987. ?5 rMf-?h 
WILLIAM B. PARSONS I I I 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BACKSTROM FAMILY LIMITED PART-
NERSHIP, FREDERICK T. BACKSTROM 
and MARY ELIZABETH BACKSTROM, 
General Partners, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
MARK HALL, and John Does 1-10, who 
may claim any interest in that certain 
parcel of real property located in Davis 
County, Utah and described more 
particularly as follows: 
BEGINNING on the South line of the State 
Highway, 50 feet South of the center line 
thereof, at a point 602.42 feet South, 
more or less, and 1498.52 feet North 
89° 3P East along the South line of said 
Highway from the Northwest corner of 
Section 25, Township 2 North, Range 1 
West, Salt Lake Meridian, and running 
thence North 89°31f East 352.44 feet 
along the South line of said Highway; 
thence South 0°54f East 643.94 feet; 
thence South 89°20!30ft West 361.36 feet 
along a line 40 rods North of the South 
line of Lot 3, Block 19, North Mill Creek 
Plat; thence North 0o06T30Tt West 645.06 
feet to the point of beginning. 
Defendants. 
COMPLAINT 
Civil No 38K 7 
^Ta*£-
Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys, Daniel W. Marcum and Gregory P. 
Hawkins, complain of the Defendants and allege as follows: 
FILMED 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
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16 
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1. Plaintiffs in this action ares 
A. Backstrom Family Limited Partnership who is a Limited 
Partnership duly organized under the laws of the State of Utah 
having its principal place of business in Davis County, State of 
Utah; 
B. Frederick T. Backstrom, General Partner of the Backstrom Family 
Limited Partnership; 
C. Mary Elizabeth Backstrom, General Partner of the Backstrom 
Family Limited Partnership. 
2. Defendants in this action are as follows: 
A. Mark Hall who is a resident of Utah County, State of Utah; 
B. John Does 1-10 who may claim any interest in that certain parcel 
" | of real property, located in Davis County, Utah, and more fully 
*"* I' described as follows: 
1511 BEGINNING on the South line of the State Highway, 
50 feet South of the center line thereof, at a point 
602.42 feet South, more or less, and 1498.52 feet 
North 89° 311 East along the South line of said 
Highway from the Northwest corner of Section 25, 
-
 R Township 2 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, 1 8 1 1
 and running thence North 89c>31? East 352.44 feet 
1 Q | , along the South line of said Highway; thence South i y
 0e54f East 643.94 feet; thence South 89°20f30?f West 
o n 361.36 feet along a line 40 rods North of the South 2 U | 1
 line of Lot 3, Block 19, North Mill Creek Plat; thence 
9 1 | . North 0°06f30ft West 645.06 feet to the point of 
^M beginning. 
**\\ 3. On or about September 17, 1985, the Defendant Mark Hall, for a valuable 
^°
l\ consideration, made, executed, and delivered to the Backstrom Family Limited Partner-
^ ' ship a certain Trust Deed Note, a copy of which is attached hereto marked Exhibit f,Af 
^'' and by reference made a part hereof, whereby said Defendant agreed to pay to the 
2" I Backstrom Family Limited Partnership, or order, the principal sum of four hundred fifty 
27 
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thousand dollars ($450,000), payable in full in one payment of $450,000 on January 6, 
1986. 
4. To secure the payment of the indebtedness evidenced by the Note, the 
Defendant Mark Hall on September 17, 1985, made, executed, and delivered to the 
Backstrom Family Limited Partnership a Trust Deed, a copy of which is attached hereto 
as Exhibit "B" and by reference made a part hereof, covering the following described real 
property (the "Property") situated in Davis County, State of Utah, to-wit: 
BEGINNING on the South line of the State Highway, 50 feet 
South of the center line thereof, at a point 602.42 feet 
South, more or less, and 1498.52 feet North 89°31' East 
along the South line of said Highway from the Northwest 
corner of Section 25, Township 2 North, Range 1 West, Salt 
Lake Meridian, and running thence North 89°31' East 352.44 
feet along the South line of said Highway; thence South 
0°54» East 643.94 feet; thence South 89°20'30" West 361.36 
feet along a line 40 rods North of the South line of Lot 3, 
Block 19, North Mill Creek Plat; thence North 0°06«30" West 
645.06 feet to the point of beginning. 
Said Trust Deed was, on September 18, 1985, duly recorded in the office of the County 
Recorder of Davis County, State of Utah, in Book 1053, at Page 8, as Entry No. 713393, 
and thereby became and still is a good and sufficient first lien upon the property, 
securing the payment of the obligation evidenced by the Note. 
5. Defendant Mark Hall has failed, neglected, and refused, despite repeated 
demands by and on behalf of Plaintiffs to make payment which beeame due and owing to 
Plaintiffs under the obligation evidenced and secured by the Note and Trust Deed on 
January 6, 1986; and because of said default, Plaintiffs have elected and do hereby elect 
pursuant to the terms of the Note to declare the entire remaining unpaid balance owing 
under the obligation evidenced and secured by the Note and Trust Deed immediately due 
and payable. 
6. There is presently due and owing to Plaintiffs from Defendant Mark Hall 
under the terms of the Note and Trust Deed the principal sum of $450,000, together with 
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interest thereon at the rate of 21% per annum from and after January 6, 1986, until 
judgment. 
7. Defendant Mark Hall agreed under the terms of the Note and Trust Deed 
to pay all costs and expenses reasonably incurred including a reasonable attorney's fee 
resulting from said Defendant's failure to perform any of his obligations thereunder. 
Plaintiffs have been required to employ the attorneys appearing herein to collect the 
indebtedness of Defendant Mark Hall, and have agreed to pay said attorneys a reasonable 
attorney's fee for their services; Plaintiffs are entitled to be awarded such additional 
sums as and for such attorney's fees as the Court may adjudge to be reasonable. 
8. Defendant Mark Hall became obligated under the terms of the Note and 
Trust Deed to pay all taxes, assessments, water rates, and other governmental or 
municipal charges or impositions levied upon or against the property, and agreed to pay 
all premiums for liability, fire and hazard insurance, insuring the property. Any and all 
sums which Plaintiffs have been or may be required to advance and/or pay, to pay and 
discharge any of said obligations are, by the terms of the Note and Trust Deed a part of 
the obligation evidenced and secured thereby and are a proper charge against said 
Defendant in this proceeding. 
9. Under the terms of the Trust Deed, Defendant Mark Hall assigned to the 
holder thereof any and all rents, issues, and profits appurtenant to the property together 
with all fixtures therein or thereafter attached hereto or used in connection therewith, 
and empowered said holder upon any default, to enter upon and/or take possession of the 
property and collect and receive all rents, issues, and profits arising therefrom or related 
thereto during the term thereof, and said Defendant further agreed that in the event of 
the commencement of an action to enforce the collection of the obligation secured 
thereby, the Court could appoint a receiver of the property, pending the foreclosure 
and/or redemption thereof. Said Defendant further agreed to the appointment of 
Plaintiffs as such Receiver. 
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WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs prays for relief as follows: 
1. For an immediate order of this Court appointing Plaintiffs as receivers to 
enter into possession of and preserve the property and to collect and receive any and all 
rents, issues, and profits therefrom pending these foreclosure proceedings and the 
expiration of the period of redemption, for application in accordance with law and the 
orders of this Court. 
2. For a judgment and decree adjudging and decreeing that Defendant Mark 
Hall is indebted to the Plaintiffs under the terms of the Note and Trust Deed for the sum 
of $450,000 together with interest thereon at the rate of 21% per annum from and after 
January 6, 1986, until judgment. 
3. For a reasonable attorney's fee as this Court may adjudge to be 
reasonable. 
4. For Plaintiffs1 costs incurred herein, including Court costs and cost of 
procuring abstracts or other evidences of title and title insurance in connection with 
these proceedings, and any sums which Plaintiffs have been or may be required to 
advance and/or pay during the pendency of these proceedings for insurance, repairs, 
and/or to pay and discharge any taxes or assessments levied upon the property, any sums 
which Plaintiffs may pay in redemption of the property from any tax sale and any sums 
which Plaintiffs may pay to discharge amounts which may become due and owing on or 
relating to any prior lien upon the property, together with interest on the amounts so 
paid. 
5. For a judgment and decree adjudging and decreeing that the Trust Deed is 
a good and sufficient first and paramount lien upon the property securing the payment of 
the obligation evidenced by the Note and ordering that the property be foreclosed and 
sold by the Sheriff of Davis County, State of Utah, according to law and the practices of 
this Court to satisfy the amounts which may be found herein to be due and owing to 
Plaintiffs from Defendant Mark Hall. 
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6. That Defendants above-named, and all persons claiming by, through, or 
under them be forever barred and foreclosed of all right, title, claim, interest, and/or 
equity of redemption in and to the property and each and every part thereof, and that 
Plaintiffs have a defieency judgment against Defendant Mark Hall for the full amount of 
any sums which may remain owing to Plaintiffs under the obligation evidenced by the 
Note after due and proper application of the proceeds of the sale of the property, as 
hereinabove stated. 
7. That Plaintiffs or any other party to this action may, upon producing 
satisfactory proof of interest, become a purchaser at said sale, that following said sale 
the Sheriff of Davis County, State of Utah, be ordered to execute and deliver a 
certificate of sale as required by law, and that upon the expiration of the period of 
redemption as prescribed by law that the Sheriff be ordered to execute and deliver a 
Deed to the purchaser of the property and that the said purchaser be let into possession 
of the property upon production of the Sheriffs Deed. 
8. That Plaintiffs be awarded such other and further relief as may appear 
just and equitable in the premises. 
DATED thisZ7'day of J-tfaujUetAJui. 19#6_. 
^-©ANIEL W. MA-RCUM, ESQ. 
GREG@R^. HAWKINS, ESQ. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Complaint was mailed to the 
following by first class mail, postage prepaid, this 2.0 day of ^jJU/VUflAJis . 
19 %(px 
James C. Haskins, Esq. 
5085 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Secretary 
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TRUST DEED NOTE 
DO NOT DESTROY THIS NOTE- Whan pakf„ faaie aata, wftfe Trwst Deed geeurmg some, mnS ha surrewcWed 
la* Trustee fee ennceaottoii, before i acofivayonce wil M I modac 
1450,ooo.oo , ._..5«lt:_lJkftj;.Uy.*-ltt»h-
_.l.epteraber__.J7
 I9u.85 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the uiidersigned, joindy aod severally, promise to pay to the order of 
F
™ ! ! ^ ^ (^&.0QQ.JQCL), 
together with interest from date at the rate of.. _ ^?JCQ... ...per cent (.. Qvfl%) per annum on 
the unpaid principal, laid principal and Intcraat payable as follows: 
$450,000.00 on but not before January 6, 1986, 
Each payment shall be applied first to accrued interest and the balance to the reduction of prindpaL Any 
such Installment not paid when due shall bear interest thereafter at the rata of~.tN£aty~£n£ per 
cast (J*1J1%) per uuam nodi paid. 
If default occurs in the payment of said installment* of principal and interest or any part thereof, or in 
the performance of any agreement contained in the Trust Deed securing this note, the holder hereof, at its 
option and without notice or demand, may dedare the entire principal balance and accrued interest due and 
payable. 
If this note is collected by an attorney after default in the payment of principal or interest, either with 
or without auit, the undersigned, joindy and severally, agree to pay all costs aod expenses of collection tnemding 
• reasonable attorney's fee* 
The makers, sureties, guarantors and endorsers hereof severally waive presentment for payment, demand 
and aodce of dishonor and nonpayment of this note, and consent to any and all extensions of time, renewals, 
waivers or modifications that may be granted by the holder hereof with respect to the payment or other pro-
visions of this ante, and to the release of an/ security, or any part thereof, with or without substitution. 
This note is secured by a Trust Deed of even date herewith. 
CLERK'S MEMO 
LEGIBILITY OF TYPING OR PRINT-
»NG UNSATISFACTORY JN THE 
DOCUMENT WHEN RECEIVED 
MARK HALL 
• L A N K NO. WIS O CSM PT« ©« — axis so acoo BAST — SALT LAKC CITY 
P PARAMOUNT TTTLf CORPORATION / (801) 497-
r y f f R C H FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP 
5IL5SV*!?...?.??..!*?.?* 
*»?j!.?...?.r!??.!.?..1**JL..?*9?? Space Above This Line For Recorder's Use 
TRUST DEED 
O With Assignment of Rente 
v 3 THIS TRUST DEED, made this \7.%k... day of Sj?P.tei*.e.n
 ( 1 9 —gS 
° * between .....HARK..HALL _ 
... as TRUSTOR, 
i 
to 
^>o whose address is ...23QLE.aL$.t...4.QQ..Np.rth Mapleton Utah 84663 
(Strwt M«J Master) (City) (SUU) 
QMtLWA.MRCUM. .„ as TRUSTEED and 
$ftt£IBMiMLr.AM , as BENEFICIARY, 
WITNESSETH: That Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST, 
WITH POWER OF SALE, the following described property, situated in JQAMSL -... 
County. SUU of Utah: 
Beginning on the South line of the State Highway, 50 feet South of the center 
line thereof, at a point 602.42 feet South, more or less, and 1498.52 feet 
North 89°3r East along the South line of said Highway from the Northwest 
corner of Section 25, Township 2 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, and 
running thence North 89°3r East 352.44 feet along the South line of said Highway; 
thence South 0o54l East 643.94 feet; thence South 89o20'30' West 361.36 feet along 
a line 40 rods North of the South line of Lot 3, Block 19, North Mill Creek Plat; 
thence North 0°06'30" West 645.06 feet to the point of beginning. 
CLERK'S MEMO 
LEGIBILITY OF TYPING OR PRINT-
!?,JG UNSATISFACTORY IN THE 
DOCUMENT WHEN RECEIVED. 
Together with all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon and a!! water rights, rights of 
way, easements, rents, issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances 
thereunto belonging, now or hereafter used or enjoyed with said property, or any part thereof, 
SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the right, power and authority hereinafter given to and conferred upon 
Beneficiary to collect and apply such rents, issues, and profits; 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING (1) payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a pro-
missory noU of even date herewith, in the principal sum of $ .450,000.00 , made by 
Trustor, payable to the order of Beneficiary at the times, in the manner and with interest as therein 
aet forth, and any extensions and/or renewals or modifications thereof; (2) the performance of 
each agreement of Trustor herein conUined; (3) the payment of such additional loans or advances as 
hereafter may be made to Trustor, or his successors or assigns, when evidenced by a promissory 
noU or notes reciting that they are secured by this Trust Deed; and (4) the payment of all sums 
expended or advanced by Beneficiary under or pursuant to the terms hereof, together with interest 
thereon as herein provided. 
•NOTE: Trustee must be a member of the Utah State Bar; a bank building and loan association or savings 
and loan association authorized to do such business in Utah; a corporation authorized to do a trust business in 
Utah; or a UUe insurance or abstract company authorised to do such business in Utah. 
* or restore promptly and in good and woramaniise r «n> ^..~,...» w..n>. „ . . , ... 
& ««d or destroyed thereon* to comply with all laws cut and re»trnt»<tns affecting said _ rt>, not 
to commit or permit waste thereof, not to commit, suffer or (lermtii any mi upon said property m vmf.iti«ui of law, to 
do all other acts which from the character or use of said prt>|K»rty ma> he reasonably necessar*. the specific 
enumerations herein not excluding the general, and if the loan wemed hrrvhy or any part thereof is being ob-
tained for the purpose of financing construction of improvements on said property Trustog furtltcr agrees 
(a) To commence construction promptly and to pursue same with reosonalile diligence to compktion 
in accordance with plans and specifications satisfactory to Beneficiary and 
(b) To allow Beneficiary to inspect said property at all times during construction 
Trustee, upon presentation to it of an affidavit atoned by Beneficiary setting forth fact* showing a default 
by Trustor under this numbered paragraph, is authorised to accept AS true and conclusive all fact* and state 
menu) therein, and to act thereon hereunder 
% To provide and maintain insurance, of such type or types and amounU as Beneficiary may require, on 
the improvements now existing or hereafter erected or placed on said pmftem Suih insurant! »hull In* carried 
in companies approved by Beneficiary with loss payable rluu*** in favwr of and in l»irm a&cr|»tablc to Ikncitoary 
In event of loss. Trustor shall give immediate notice to Benefitiary wlm may makt pr»>»f of !«•* and eoth insurance 
company concerned ss hereby suthomed and directed to makt payment for Mi<h l«*sw directly to lt**n<*fictar> 
instead of to Trustor and Ikneficiary jointly and the insurance proceed* oi any |>art then**4 may be applied 
by Beneficiary, at its option, to reduction of the &ndebtedne*s hereby S4.*cu red or to the restoration or repair 08 
the property damaged 
3 To deliver to, pay for and maintain with Beneficiary until the indebtedness secured hereby is paid in full 
such evidence of title as Beneficiary may require including abstract* ol title or policies of title insurance and 
any ei tensions or renewals thereof or supplements thereto 
4 To appear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof, the title to 
said property, or the right* os powers of Beneficiary or Trustee and should Beneficiary or Trustee elect to 
also appear in or defend any such action or proceeding to pay alt costs and expenses, including cost of evi-
dence of title and attorney s fees m a reasonable sum incurred by Beneficiary or Trustee 
5 To pay at least 10 days before delinquency all taxes and assessments affecting said property, including 
all assessments upon water company stock and all rents assessments and charges for water appurtenant to or 
used in connection with said property, to pay, when due, all encumbrances charges, and liens with interest, 
on said property or any part thereof, which at any time appear to be prior or superior hereto, to pay all costs, 
feat, and expenses of this Trust 
6 Should Trustor fad to make any °myment or to do any act as herein provided then Beneficiary or 
Trust**, but without obligation so to do and without notice to or demand upon Trustor and without releasing 
Trustor from any obligation hereof, may Make or do the same in such manner and to such extent as either may 
deem necessary to protect the security hereof, Beneficiary or Trustee being authorised to enter upon said 
property for such purposes, commence, appear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the 
security hereof or the rights of powers oi Beneficiary or Trustee, pay, purchase, contest or compromise any 
encumbrance, charge or lien which in the judgment of either appears to be prior or superior hereto, and in ex-
•rosing any such powers incur any liability, expend whatevei amounts in it* absolute discretion it may ' 
therefor, including cost of evidence of title, employ counsel, and pay his reasonable fees 
I To pay immediately and without demand all sura* expended hereunder by Beneficiary or Trustee, 
with interest from date of expenditure at the rate of ten per cent (10%) per annum until paid, and the repay* 
meat thereof shall be secured hereby 
IT 18 MUTUALLY AGREED THAT: 
§. Should said property or any part thereof be taken or damaged by reason of any public improvement 
or condemnation proceeding or damaged by fire, or earthquake, or in any other manner Beneficiary shall be 
entitled to all compensation, awards, and other payments or relief therefor, and shall be entitled at its option 
to commence, appear m and prosecute in sis own name any action or proceeding? or to make any compro-
mise or settlement, in connection with such taking or damage AM such compensation awards, damages, rights 
of action and proceeds including the proceeds of any policies of fire and other insurance affecting said property, 
are hereby assigned to Beneficiary, who may, after deducting therefrom all its expenses indudmg attorney's feet, 
apply the same on any indebtedness secured hereby Trustor agrees to execute such further assignments of any 
compensation^ award, damages, end rights of action and proceeds as Beneficiary or Trustee may require 
ft At any time and from time to time upon wnttten request of Beneficiary, payment of its fees and pre* 
•agitation of thu Trust Deed md the note for endorsement (in case of full reconveyance for cancellation and 
retention), without affecting the liability of any person for the payment of the indebtedness secured hereby, 
Trustee may (a) consent to the making of any map or plat of said property, (b) join in granting any ease 
men* or creating any restrict*** thereon, (c) join in any subordination or other agreement affecting this Trust Deed 
or the hen or cliarge thereof, (d) reconvey, without warranty all or any part of said property The grantee in 
any reconveyance may be described as "the person or persons entitled thereto", and the recitals therein of any 
matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of truthfulness thereof Trustor agrees to pay reasonable Trustee's 
fees for any of the services mentioned in this paragraph. 
10 As additional security Trustor hereby assigns Beneficiary, during the continuance of these trusts all 
rants issues royalties and profits of the property affected by thu Trust Deed and of any personal property 
located thereon Until Trustor shall default in the payment of any indebtedness secured hereby or in the per-
formance of any agreement hereunder. Trustor shall have the right to collect all such rents issues royalties, 
and profits earned prior to default as they become due and payable If Trustor shall default as aforesaid. 
Trustor's right to collect any of such moneys shall cease and Beneficiary shall have (the right with or without 
taking possession of the property affected hereby, to collect all rents royalties, issues and profits Failure or 
discontinuance of Beneficiary at any time or from time to lume to collect any such moneys shall not in any 
manner affect the subsequent enforcement by Beneficiary of the right, power and authority to collect the same 
Nothing contained herein, nor the exercise of the right by Beneficiary to collect, shall be or be construed to 
be. an affirmation by Beneficiary of any tenancy lease or option, nor an assumption of handily under, nor a 
subordination of the lien or charge of thai Trust Deed to any such tenancy, lease or option 
II Upon any default by Trustor hereunder Beneficiary may at any tune without notice, either in 
person, by agent, or by a receiver to be appointed by a court (Trustor hereby consenting to the appointment of 
Beneficiary as such receiver), and without regard to the adequacy of any security for the indebtedness hereby 
secured, enter upon and take possession of said property or any part thereof in its own name sue for or 
otherwise collect said rents, issues, and profits, indudmg those past due and unpaid and apply the same leas 
costs and expenses of operation and collection, indudmg reasonable attorney's fees, upon any indebtedness 
secured hereby, and in such order as Beneficiary may determine 
11 The entering upon and taking possession of said property the collecton of such rents issues, and 
profits, or the proceeds of fire and other insurance policie* or compensation or awards for any taking or 
damage of said property, and the application or release thereof as aforesaid shall not cure or waive any 
default or notice of default hereunder or invalidate any act done pursuant to such notice 
13 The failure on the part ol Beneficiary to promptly enforce any right hereunder shall not operate aa 
£ waiver of such right and (he waiver by Beneficiary of any default shall not constitute a waiver of any other 
ot subsequent default 
14 Time ** of the essence hereof Upon default by Trustor in the payment of any indebtedness secured here-
by or in the performance of any agreement hereunder, all sums secured hereby shall immediately become due 
and payable at the option of Beneficiary In the event of such default Beneficiary may execute or cause Trustee 
to execute a written notice of default and of election to cause said property to be sold to satisfy the obligations 
hereof, and Trustee si all file such notice for record in each county wherein said property or some part or 
parcel thereof is situated Beneficiary also shall deposit with Trustee, the note and ail documents evidencing 
expenditures secured hereby 
CLERK'S MEMO 
LEGIBILITY OF TYPING OR PRINT-
ING UNSATISFACTORY IN THE 
DOCUMENT WHEN RECEIVED 
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tha order in which audi property, if conaiating of aevar* ^ w n Iota or parcels, ahall be ao» A public 
auction to tha highest bidder, the purchaae price payable in lawful anonev of the United State* at tne tam* af 
sale. The person conducting tha aale amay. for any cause he deems e&pedient, uostponc the sale from time to 
thereof by such person at the time and place last appointed for the sale; provided, if the sale is postponed 
for longer than one day beyond the day deaianated in the notice of sale, notice thereof shall be given in the 
•SUM manner as the original notice of aale. Trustee ahall eaecute and deliver to the purchaser its Deed con-
veying said property so sold, but without any covenant or warranty, express or implied. The recitals in the 
Dead ol any matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of the truthfulness thereof. Any person, including Bene-
ficiary, may bid at the sale. Trustee ahall apply the proceeds of the sale to payment of (1) the costs and 
expenses of exercising the power of sale and ol the aale, including the payment of the Trustees and attorney's 
lees; (2) cost of any evidence of title procured in connection with such sale and revenue stamps on Trustee's Deed; 
(3) all sums expended under the terms hereof, not then repaid, with accrued interest at 10% per annum from date 
of expenditure; (4) all other sums then secured hereby; and (5) the remainder, if any. to the person or persona 
legally entitled thereto, or the Trustee, in its discretion, may deposit the balance of such proceed* with the County 
Clerk ol the county in which the sale took place. 
16. Upon the occurrence of any default hereunder, Beneficiary ahall have the option to declare all sums 
aacured hereby immediately due and payable and foreclose this Trust Deed in the manner provided by law 
lor tha foreclosure of mortgages on real property and Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover in such proceed-
ing all costs and expenses incident thereto, including a reaaonabJe attorney's fee in such amount »» shall be 
fixed by tha court. 
17. Beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at any time by filing for record in the office ol the County 
Recorder ol each county in which said property or some part thereof is situated, a substitution of trustee. From 
tha time tha substitution is filed for record, the new trustee shall succeed to all the powers, duties, authority 
and title ol the
 t trustee named herein or of any successor trustee. Each such substitution shall be executed and 
acknowledged, and notice thereof shall be given and proof thereof made, in the manner provided by law. 
18. This Trust Deed shall apply to, inure to the benefit ol, and bind all parties hereto, their heirs, legatees, 
devisees, adminstrators, executors, successors and assigns. All obligations of Trustor hereunder are joint and 
several. The term "Beneficiary** ahall mean the owner and holder, including any pledgee, of the note secured 
hereby. In this Trust Deed, whenever the context requires, the masculine gender includes the feminine and/or 
neuter, and the singular number includes the plural. 
19. Trustee accepts this Trust when this Trust Deed, duly executed and acknowledged, is made a public 
record as provided by law. Trustee is not obligated to notify any party hereto ol pending aale under any other 
Trust Deed or of any'action or proceeding in which Trustor, Beneficiary, or Trustee shall be a party, unless 
brought by Trustee. 
90. This Trust Deed ahall be construed according to tha laws ol the State ol Utah 
21. Tha undersigned Trustor requests that a copy ol any notice ol default and ol any notice ol sale 
hereunder be mailed to him at tha address hereinbefore set forth. 
*Th1s Trust Deed Includes additional terms 
attached hereto entitled "Addendum to Trust 
teed", incorporated herein by reference. 
Signature ol Trustor 
HARK HALL* 
(If Traator an Individual) 
STATE OP UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT UffcE 
On the l i t * day of $ « ? * • * £ A.D. 19...S5. penooaUy 
appeared before me MARK..HALL , 
the aignerU) of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that ....be.... executed the 
ftQAifiuaJbish. 
Notary Public residing at: 
My Commission Expires: 
l-lt-%1. §kClMM 
(If Trustor a Corporation) 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF 
On the day of , A.D. 19 , personally 
appeared before me , who being by me duly sworn, 
says that he is the of , 
the corporation that executed the above and foregoing instrument and that said instrument was 
signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of its by-laws (or by authority of a resolution 
of its board of directors) and said acknowledged 
to me that said corporation executed the same. 
Notary Public residing at: 
My Commission Expires: 
CLERKS MEMO 
LEGIBILITY OF TYPING OR PRINT-
ING UNSATISFACTORY IN THE 
DOCUMENT WHEN RECEIVED. 
ADDENDUM TO TRUST DEED 
The undersigned do hereby include as part of the Trust Deed (incorporated 
herein by reference) the following additional termss 
L Mark Hall agrees to purchase liability insurance in the amount of 
$ ^00. O O P and to name The Backstrom Family Limited Partnership, 
Fred 3ackstrom and Mary Backstfirm, as co-insureds. Mark Hall further 
agrees to furnish written proof of said insurance upon request. 
2* Mark Hall agrees to assume and continue all existing contracts relating to 
n* the ownership and operation of the mobile home park including, * ' ^ 
r
, all tenant leases and money deposits therein and trash and 
garbabe disposal contracts with Reliable Waste. 
3. Mark Hall agrees to lease the current space for a mobile home to Fred and 
Mary Backstrom for a period of two (2) years from October 1, 1985 for the 
rent of $125 per month, payable monthly. T ^ £ > f^rrn/^eAw 
DATED this \l day of September, 1985. ° y ^L^f 
MARK HALL 
^ FRED/BACKSTROM Individually "and as 
General Partner of the Backstrom 
Family Limited Partnership 
MA^Y BA<CKSTRO 
ttlcA4&*<> 
r J STROM"—-
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DANIEL W. MARCUM, ESQ., #2080 
GREGORY P. HAWKINS, ESQ., #4485 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
275 East 200 South, Suite 150 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 359-8900 
FILED !H CLEWS DrFIC; 
DAVIS CU'KIY. UTAH 
1333 APR 16 AM II: 0 2 
M • ** i:' "*: ^ »« i r i: • •\ r i r z v 
Ot-» f " " ' *• ** » rm*»T 
CY. 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BACKSTROM FAMILY LIMITED PART-
NERSHIP, FREDERICK T. BACKSTROM 
and MARY ELIZABETH BACKSTROM, 
General Partners, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
MARK HALL, and John Does 1-10, who 
may claim any interest in that certain 
parcel of real property located in Davis 
County, Utah and described more 
particularly as follows: 
BEGINNING on the South line of the State 
Highway, 50 feet South of the center line 
thereof, at a point 602.42 feet South, 
more or less, and 1498.52 feet North 
89° 31* East along the South line of said 
Highway from the Northwest corner of 
Section 25, Township 2 North, Range 1 
West, Salt Lake Meridian, and running 
thence North 89°31' East 352.44 feet 
along the South line of said Highway; 
thence South 0°54' East 643.94 feet; 
thence South 89o20'30" West 361.36 feet 
along a line 40 rods North of the South 
line of Lot 3, Block 19, North Mill Creek 
Plat; thence North 0°06»30" West 645.06 
feet to the point of beginning. 
Defendants. 
STIPULATION 
Civil No. 38927 
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Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys, Daniel W. Mareum and Gregory P, 
Hawkins, and Defendant, by and through his attorney, James C. Haskins, stipulate and 
agree as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs agree to waive the interest accruing on the balance of $450,000 
due under the Trust Deed Note for, and only for, the period from 
March y/A , 1986, to March 31, 1986. Defendant will continue to be liable 
for interest accrued at the rate of 21% per annum prior to March 31 % 
1986, and which will begin to accrue again on April 1, 1986, anything herein 
to the contrary notwithstanding. 
2. Defendant agrees that by March 31, 1986 he will pay the following amounts 
to Plaintiffs? 
a. $450,000, which amount represents the balance due Plaintiffs under e 
Trust Deed Note. 
b. The interest which has accrued at the rate of 21% per annum or 
$450,000 from January 7, 1986 to March
 f 1986. 
c. All costs incurred by Plaintiffs due to Defendant's default including 
but not limited to, the foreclosure report, costs of service, recording 
fees, etc. and 
do Plaintiffs' reasonable attorney's fees from January 6, 1986 until th< 
date of final payment. 
3. Defendant agrees that the rents collected during the month of February 
1986, are to be paid to the Receiver appointed by the Court under orde 
dated February 28, 1986, and held in the Trust Account of Daniel W 
Mareum until final resolution of this matter. 
4. Plaintiffs agree that if Defendant fully complies with the stipulations se 
forth in paragraph 2-3 by March 31, 1986, Plaintiffs' will dismiss with 
-2-
prejudice their claims and causes of action against the Defendant Mart 
Hall. 
Defendant and Plaintiffs agree that if Defendant does not fully complj 
with the particulars of paragraph 2-3 above by March 31, 1986, judgment 
will be immediately entered, without Defendant contesting the judgment; 
as follows: 
a. That the subject property of this action will be foreclosed and title tc 
said property will be transferred to and vested in the Plaintiffs. 
b. That judgment will be granted against Mark Hall in favor of Plaintiffs 
for an amount equal to interest accrued on $450,000 from January 73 
1986, until March , 1986. 
c. That judgment will be granted against Defendant and in favor of 
Plaintiffs for all costs incurred by Plaintiffs due to Defendant's 
default, including but not limited to, the foreclosure report, costs of 
service, property tax past due, recording fees, etc. 
d. That judgment will be granted against Defendant and in favor of 
Plaintiffs for Plaintiffs' reasonable attorney's fees from January 6, 
1986 until judgment is entered hereon. 
Plaintiffs agree to credit toward the amount due under paragraph 5 the net 
receipts deposited in Daniel W. Marcum's Trust Account including the 
money referred to in paragraph 3 above and the money received as rents by 
the Court appointed Receiver, minus the ordinary and necessary expenses 
to maintain the subject property in operating condition; including, but not 
limited to, utilities, waste removal, property tax, insurance payments, 
water bills, sewer bills, normal or necessary repairs, etc. 
-3-
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7. Defendant acknowledges that he has read this Stipulation and is entering 
into it with and under advice of legal counsel. 
DATED this J day of & « y . 1 9 / ^ 
PLAINTIFFS: 
a DANIEL W. MARCUM ;, ESQ. 
DEFENDANT? 
MARK HALL 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
JAMES ,C. HASKINS, ESQ. 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Stipulation was mailed to the 
following by first class mail, postage prepaid, this lip day of LA/1 U X 
1 9 ^ : 
James C. Haskins, Esq. 
5085 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
f) n> 
^Secretary 
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EXHIBIT E, COht. 
DANIEL W. MARCUM, ESQ., #2080 
GREGORY P. HAWKINS, ESQ., #4485 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
275 East 200 South, Suite 150 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 359-8900 
FILEOIHC'F^-cOff-C 
DAY!!, c :•_:;; Y.'JTV-h 
IS35 APR 2 9 FH 3= 24 
. ^A I 
: . . .• i ; . % 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BACKSTROM FAMILY LIMITED PART-
NERSHIP, FREDERICK T« BACKSTROM 
and MARY ELIZABETH BACKSTROM, 
General Partners, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
MARK HALL, and John Does 1-10, who 
may claim any interest in that certain 
parcel of real property located in Davis 
County, Utah and described more 
particularly as follows: 
BEGINNING on the South line of the State 
Highway, 50 feet South of the center line 
thereof, at a point 602.42 feet South, 
more or less, and 1498.52 feet North 
89°31f East along the*South line of said 
Highway from the Northwest corner of 
Section 25, Township 2 North, Range 1 
West, Salt Lake Meridian, and running 
thence North 89°31f East 352.44 feet 
along the South line of said Highway; 
thence South 0°54f East 643.94 feet; 
thence South 89°20f30" West 361.36 feet 
along a line 40 rods North of the South 
line of Lot 3, Block 19, North Mill Creek 
Plat; thence North O^'SO" West 645.06 
feet to the point of beginning. 
Defendants. 
) 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 38927 
V-150 
Plaintiffs1 Motion for Entry of Judgment, having come before the Court pursuant 
to an Order to Show Cause and the Court having reviewed the pleadings on file, the 
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EXHIBIT E, cont. 
Stipulation of the parties, the Stipulation of Frederick T. Backstrom, the Affidavit of 
Costs and Attorney's fees, and it appearing to the Court that the Defendant Mark Hall 
has not complied with the terms of said stipulation wherein Defendant agreed to make 
certain payments and the Court being otherwise fully advised in the premises It is 
hereby: 
ADJUDGED, ORDERED, AND DECREED as follows: 
1. 31»t the subject property of this action is hereby foreclosed with respect 
to any interest claimed by Defendant Mark Hall or any party claiming by or through him, 
and title to said property is hereby transferred to and vested in the Plaintiffs subject 
only to the easements and rights of way of record as of January 7, 1986. The subject 
property is more fully described as follows: 
BEGINNING on the South line of the State Highway, 50 feet 
South of the center line thereof, at a point 602,42 feet South, 
more or less, and 1498.52 feet North 89°311 East along the 
South line of said Highway from the Northwest corner of 
Section 25, Township 2 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake 
Meridian, and running thence North 89° 31* East 352.44 feet 
along the South line of said Highway; thence South 0° 54* East 
643.94 feet; thence South 89°20,30n West 361.36 feet along a 
line 40 rods North of the South line of Lot 3, Block 19, North 
MiU Creek Plat; thence North 0°06'30" West 645.06 feet to 
the point of beginning. 
2. That Judgment is entered against Defendant Mark Hall in favor oi 
Plaintiffs for an amount equal to interest accrued at the rate of 21% per annum or 
$450,000 or $258.90 per day from January 7, 1986, until judgment is entered herein, for i 
total prejudgment interest of $ J-£. ??£, To 
3. That Judgment is entered against Defendant Mark Hall in favor o 
Plaintiffs for an amount equal to costs incurred by Plaintiffs in relation to this action i 
the amount of $ j/S3«&? ML 
4. That judgment is entered against Defendant Mark Hall in favor of Plaintiff 
for an amount equal to Plaintiffs' reasonable attorney's fees incurred in relation to thi 
action in the amount of $ ^ . £, 3^' P* > C Q f ^ ? this sum may b 
-2-
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EXHIBIT E, cont. 
increased from time to time as proven by Affidavit of Plaintiffs' Counsel and approved 
by this Court, in order to effect collection on this judgment or any part thereof. 
5. That Judgment be entered against Defendant Mark Hall in favor of 
Plaintiffs for an amount equal to the rents collected by Defendant or Defendants' agents 
during the month of February, 1986, which amount is $ ?, 00a. *o / W ^ ' C . 
Said judgment including all the above amounts shall be reduced by the net 
receipts deposited in the Trust Account of Daniel W. Marcum under paragraphs 3 and 6 oi 
the aforementioned stipulation and under the provisions of the Court's Order Appointing 
9 | | a Receiver dated February 28, 1986, for a total amount of the reduction being 
Judgment, therefore, is granted against Mark Hall and in favor of Plaintiffs ii 
the total dollar amount of % 3 /. 7(?£< 9J ^(^jC 
DATED this ^ ^ day of /fa~s/ 1 9 / £ . 
BY THE COURT: 
HONOR^E DOUGLAS 1. CORNAHY 
Utah Second Judicial District Court 
-3-
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311 1 hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Judgment was mailed to the 
J following by first class mail, postage prepaid, this \ /r/^day of OLCAX J? 
19 9J& 
12 
13 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
James C. Haskins, Esq* 
5085 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF DAVIS )9S _ 
! THE UNDERSIGNED, CLERK OF THE DISTRICT SeCre ta rV 
COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, UTAH DO HEREBY J 
1 1 11 CERTIFY THAT THE ANNEXED AND FOREGOING IS 
A TRUE AND FULL COPY OF AN ORIGINAL DOCU-
MENT ON FILE IN MY OFFICE AS SUCH CLERK 
WITNESS MY HAND SEAL OF SAID OFFICE 
THISJLDAY ^](Hj _ iai2L 
M I C H A E L G. A L L P H I N , C L E R K 
14 pv /AliMOvJ 1 
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WILLIAM B. PARSCNS III #2535 
Attorney at Law 
1200 University Q u b Building 
136 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-1300 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE SECDND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OOURT 
IN AND FCR DWIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-cOo-
BACKSTECM FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP 
EREDERICK T. BACKSTBOM and MARY 
ELIZffiETH BACKSTBOM, General P a r t n e r s 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
MARK HALL, and John Does 1-IC, who 
may claim any i n t e r e s t in tha t 
ce r t a in parcel of rea l property 
located in Davis County, Utah and 
described more pa r t i cu l a r l y as 
follows: 
BEGINNING on the South l i n e of the 
State Highway, 50 feet South of the 
center l i n e thereof f a t a point 602.42 
feet South, more or l e s s , and 1498.52 
fee t North 89*31f East along the South 
l ine of said Highway frcm the North-
west corner of Section 25, Township 
2 North, Ranqe 1 West, Sa l t Lake 
Meridian, and running thence North 
89e31 f East 352.44 fee t along the 
South l i ne of sa id Highway? thence 
South 0#54f East 643,94 fee t ; thence 
South 89#20'30" West 361.36 feet along 
a l i n e 40 rods North of the South l ine 
of Lot 3 , Block 19, North Mill Creek 
P la t ; thence North 0'06 f30" West 
645.06 fee t t o the point of beginning 
MEMORANDA IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO VACATE 
SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER AND IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO REQUIRE 
COMPLIANCE WITH THE MORTGAGE 
P0REO0SUPE STATUTE 3Y 
PLAINTIFFS RZ> EFFECT A SALE 
C i v i l No. 38927 
Defendants . 
FACTS 
In this case a mortgage foreclosure action was insti tuted by the 
Plaintiffs with the Complaint having been dated the 27th day of February 1986 
and with the Court in said Complaint having been requested specifically to 
invoke the jurisdiction of this Court for purposes of determining that a 
judicial sale may follow of the real property secured by certain Trust Deed 
and that followinq said judicial sale a sher i f f ' s deed may issue. That 
invokes the relief of th is Court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 78-37-1. 
ARGUMBTT 
There is in this jurisdiction what is known as a "one action" rule. 
This rule states that when an obligation is secured solely by mortgage upon 
real property that there can be only one action for tr.e recovery of any debt 
or the enforcement of any right and that action must oe in accordance with 
the provisions of the mortgage foreclosure law as covered by the Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended. 
In the 1909 case of BQUCOfsRi V, Jacobin, 36 Utah 165, 104 P. 117, 
(1909)
 r the Court essentially found that a secured party cannot seek a 
personal judgrient but must foreclose the real property securing the debt as a 
mortgage. In the case of Hammond v. Wall, 51 Utah 454, 171 P. 148, (1918), 
the Utah Supreme Court found way back in 1918 that you may not resort to 
other assets of the Debtor but must look first to the mortgage foreclosure. 
In the case of First National Bank of Coalville v. Bolev, 90 Utah 341, 344, 
61 P.2d 621, (1936), the Supreme Court found that in order to look to any 
other assets you must f i r s t have exhausted a l l of the value and quantity of 
any existing real property covered by the mortgage. This has not been done 
by Dan Marconi and Victor Lawrence in behalf of the Plaint iffs , 
Mr. Marccm and Mr. Lawrence have acquired a Judgment and Order in th is 
case but that Order does not provide for a sale and the Judgment does provide 
for sane $31
 f000.00 plus, that Judgment i s based upon a Stipulation and that 
Stipulation bespeaks of interest on the mortgage and mortgaged property, 
costs and attorney's fees as the foundation for the $31,000.00. There are 
also significant Affidavits evidencing such other additional costs as the 
Plaintiffs have sought to include in this Judgment, the detail and canplexity 
of which are very impressive. Unfortunately the Judgment i t se l f says in i t s 
f i r s t paragraph that the subject property the action i s foreclosed and that 
judgment i s entered against Hall based upon a twenty-one percent (21%) per 
annum rate on the $450,000.00 that was the subject matter of the underlying 
Trust Deed Note that was being foreclosed as a mortgage in the case. The 
Judgment further provides for costs and fees associated with this "foreclosure 
proceeding". Followinq the acquisition of th is Judgment, Mr. Lawrence and Mr. 
Marcom subsequently garnished a bank account and acquired a Supplemental 
Order against the Defendant Mark Hall a l l without ever having acquired an 
Order of Sale or having conducted a sale or acquiring a Deficiency Judgment. 
Under the one action rule the statute protects the debtor by preventing the 
creditor frcm prosecuting more than one action to the recover the same debt 
but the Plaintiffs have in th is case brought an action in the Fourth District 
Court seeking to attach and set aside transfers of certain properties 
involving Mark Hall again without having an Order requiring the conducting of 
a sale, the actual conducting of a sale or allowing the redemption period to 
expire. It is respectfully submitted that a foreclosure and sale is required 
in order to terminate Mark Hallfs right of redemption or even to terminate 
Mark Hallfs title as the purchaser and mortgagor of the real property. At 
this particular point Mark Hall still owns the real property and until they 
conduct a mortgage foreclosure sale and allow the period of redemption to run 
the rights of redemption will not have expired and the ownership interest of 
Mark Hall will not have terminated regardless of the existance of the Order 
and Judgnrent rendered by this .Court because this Court does not have the 
ability or authority to enter an Order and Judgnent in contravention of the 
statute and the rules of law of this state most particularly the rule of law 
known as the one action rule. There has not been in this existing Trust Deed 
and Note and default subsequent to the execution of the same any nonjudicial 
sale that has taken place nor any attempt at a concurrent nonjudicial sale 
with this mortgage foreclosure, only this foreclosure proceeding which 
inartfully bespeaks of foreclosing Mark Hall's rights and interest without 
actually claiming in the prayers for relief to seek an order of a mortgage 
foreclosure or the enforcement under Section 57-1-23 that the Trust Deed be 
foreclosed in conformity with the mortgage foreclosure statute. 
The Stewart Livestock Company v. Ostler, 105 I'tah 529, 144 P.2d 276, 
(1943), provides us with a judicial determination that a foreclosure decree 
must specify the amount due including costs and disbursements. This judgment 
even though it doesn't call itself a foreclosure decree does bespeak of the 
amount due including costs and disbursements and interest arising on the 
obligation all as is provided in a standard mortgage foreclosure and as is 
required, the only thing that this judgment fails to do is to direct the sale 
of the property in conformity with the prayer for relief of the Complaint or 
in conformity with the requirements of the mortgage foreclosure statute. 
Rule 69(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides the manner in 
which redemption may follow a sale and gives us guidelines concerning, in 
subparagraph (6) thereof, the rights to rents during that redemption term. 
It is the mortgagor's rights which have been violated by Plaintiffs in this 
case and the mortgagor in this case, to wit the Defendant Mark Hall, is 
entitled to the rents accrued during the term of the pendancy of the action 
in conformity with Rule 69(f)(6). 
QQNOUSIQN 
In conclusion we respectfully sutxrdt that sanctions are in order, that 
attorney's fees paid by Mark Hall to William ?ar?ons ?hx'ir — the 
responsibility of the Plaintiffs and an order granted forthwith requiring the 
payment of those sums in the amount of $3,500.00 in conformity with the 
Affidavit of Mr. Parsons submitted simultaneously with this Memoranda. 
Further we respectfully submit that the sums collected oy the Receiver during 
the pendancy of this mortgage foreclosure and until such time as a sale 
actually takes place should be accounted to Mark Hall and paid over to Mark 
Hall as the mortgagor, owner and person entitled to possession and rents 
durinq the pendancy of the action. And last but not least we respectfully 
sutmit that the Plaintiffs be required to ccmply with the mortgage foreclosure 
statute, require of the Court an Order of Sale, conduct the sale, allow the 
period of redemption to run, and subsequently attempt to acquire a Deficiency 
Judgment if they are capable of conducting the sale in conformity with the 
statute and entitling themselves to said judgment, 
DATED this iE#day of fic^6v£«- , 1986. 
/** lr-^ / ds<~<th&<X.<£h-
WIIliIAM B. PARSONS T i l 
Attorney for Defendant 
WILLIAM B. PARSCNS III #2535 
Attorney at Law 
1200 University CLub Building 
136 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-1300 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE SEOOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OOUPT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUtfTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-oOo-
BACKSTROM FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ) 
FREDERICK T. BACKSTOOM, and MARY ) 
ELIZABETH BACKSTROM, General Partners ) 
) MOTION TO OOMPEL 
Plaintiffs, ) ORDER OF SALE 
-vs- ) 
MARK HALLr and John Does 1-10, wno ) 
nay claim any interest in that ) 
certain parcel of real property ) 
located in Davis County, Utah and ) 
described more particularly as ) 
follows: ) 
BEGINNING on the South line of the ) 
State Highway, 50 feet South of the ) 
center line thereof, at a point 602.42 ) 
feet South, more or less, and 1498.52 ) Civil No, 38927 
feet North 89*31' East along the South ) 
line of said Highway from the North- ) 
west corner of Section 25, Township ) 
2 North. Ranqe 1 West, Salt Lake ) 
Meridian, and running thence North ) 
89*31' East 352.44 feet alonq the ) 
South line of said Highway; thenoe ) 
South 0°54* East 643.94 feet; thence ) 
South 89°20,30,f Wfest 361.36 feet along ) 
a line 40 rods North of the South line ) 
of Lot 3, Block 19, North Mill Creek ) 
Plat; thence North 0*06'30" West ) 
645.06 feet to the point of uecunr.ir.g ) 
Defendants. 
ODMES NOW the Defendant Mark Hall and moves the above entitled Court 
for an Order compelling the sale of the secured property in conformity with 
the mortgage foreclosure statutes of the State of Utah* 
This Motion is supported by Memoranda submitted herewith briefly 
outlining the responsibility of the Plaintiffs to comply with the one action 
rule in the collection of all debts arising out of transactions involving the 
use of secured property. 
Plaintiffs have"heretofore undertaken an action in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court pertaining to rights, titles and interest in and to real 
property of the Defendant and have undertaken a garnishment approved by the 
Second District Court of the Defendant Mark Hall's personal bank account. 
Those actions were undertaken prior to a sale of the secured property and the 
entry of any deficiency judgment and violate the responsibilities possed upon 
Plaintiffs by the one action rule, 
DAIED this 7 day of flri- , 1986. 
iQy, t^ Kg* <3^4*y*A 
WILLIAM B. PARSONS III 
Attorney for Defendant 
MMLING CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and fore-
going Motion to Cartpel Order of Sale was mailed postage prepaid this _~L day 
_ , 1986, to: 
Daniel W. Marcum 
Victor Lawrence 
Attorneys at Law 
275 East 200 South #150 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
itfi Gay <Oarter, S Jer  Carte ecretary 
WILLIAM B. PARSONS III #2535 
Attorney at Law 
1200 University Club Building 
136 East South Tanple 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111 
Telephones (801) 364-1300 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTYr STATE OF UTAH 
-oOo-
BACKSTOQM FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ) 
FREDERICK T. BACKSTROM, and MARY ) 
ELIZABETH BACKSTRDM, General Partners ) 
) MOTION TO VACATE 
Plaintiffs, ) SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER 
-vs- ) 
MARK HALL, and John Does 1-10, who ) 
may claim any interest in that ) 
certain parcel of real property ) 
located in Davis County, Utah and ) 
described more particularly as ) 
follows: ) 
BEGINNING on the South line of the ) 
State Highway, 50 feet South of the ) 
center line thereof, at a point 602.42 ) 
feet South, more or less, and 1498.52 ) Civil No. 38927 
feet North 89d31f East along the South ) 
line of said Highway from the North- ) 
west corner of Section 25, Township ) 
2 North. Range 1 West, Salt Lake ) 
Meridian, and running thence North ) 
89*31§ East 352.44 feet alonq the ) 
South line of said Highway; thence ) 
South 0*54f East 643.94 feet; thence ) 
South 89*20f30w West 361.36 feet along ) 
a line 40 rods North of the South line ) 
of Lot 3, Block 19, North Mill Creek ) 
Plat; thence North 0*06f30" West ) 
645.06 feet to the point of beginning ) 
Defendants* 
C30MES NOW the Defendant Mark Hall by and through his attorney of record 
William B. Parsons I I I and moves the above enti t led Court enter an Order 
vacating the Supplemental Order on the basis that the Supplemental Order in 
these proceedinqs was an attempt by the Plaintiffs to collect a judgment of 
seme $31,700.00 approximately acquired as a result of the accumulation of 
interest , costs and fees involvinq the foreclosure of the real property that 
i s the subject matter of the foreclosure proceeding giving rise to the 
jurisdiction of th is Court. Any attempt at collecting through Supplemental 
Proceedings or otherwise the $31,700.00 i s a violation of the one action rule 
requirinq s t r i c t conformity with the mortgage foreclosure statutes including 
but not limited to the sale of the secured real property and the application 
to the above ent i t led Court for a deficiency judgment with a responsibility 
for a hearing on the merits as to the propriety of the entry of said 
judqment. No deficiency judepent has been entered and no sale has taken 
place and i t i s not possible for the Plaintiffs to bifurcate their judgments 
for principal frcm interest and costs and attempt to collect the same frcm 
various or differing sources cf revenue or assets of the Defendant. 
This Motion to vacate the Supplemental Crc^r is ^uroor^-d by the 
Memoranda supplied by the Defendant Mark Hall pertaining to the application 
of the one action rule in the State of Utah. 
DAIED this 9 day of Ori~. , 1986. 
WILLIAM B. PARSONS I I I 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and fore-
going Motion to Vacate Supplemental Order was mailed postage prepaid this J? 
day of OcJr. , 1986, to: 
Daniel W* Marcum 
Victor Lawrence 
Attorneys at Law 
275 East 200 South #150 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Jeti Gay Qkz 
^4AJU\ 
ter, Secretary 
WILLIAM B. PARSCNS III #2535 
Attorney at Law 
1200 University CLub Building 
136 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-1300 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE SECEND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FCR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-oOc-
BACKSIFOM FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ) 
FREDERICK T. BACKSTKOM and MAPY > 
ELIZABETH BACKSTROM, General Partners ) 
Plaintiffs, ) rOTICN TO SET fiSILE 
) APPOINTMENT OF RECEIVER 
- v s - ) 
MARK HALL, and John Does 1-10, who ) 
may claim any i n t e r e s t in tha t ) 
ce r ta in parcel of r ea l property ) 
located in Davis County, Utah and ) 
described more p a r t i c u l a r l y as ) 
follows: ) 
BEGINNING on the South l i n e of the ) 
State Highway, 50 feet South of the ) 
center l i ne thereof, a t a point 602.42 ) 
feet South, more or l e s s , and 1498.52 ) 
fee t North 89°31f East along the South ) Civi l No. 38927 
l ine of said Highway fran the North- j 
west corner of Section 25, Township ) 
2 North, Ranqe 1 West, Sa l t Lake ) 
Meridian, and running thence North ) 
89°31f East 352.44 feet alonq the ) 
South l i ne of said Highway; thence ) 
South 0°54f East 643.94 fee t ; thence ) 
South 89*20'30" West 361.36 feet along ) 
a l i ne 40 rods North of the South l ine ) 
of Lot 3, Block 19, North Mill Cree* ) 
P l a t ; thence North 0*06f30" West ) 
645.06 feet to the point of oeuirr.mg ) 
Defendants. 
OOMES NOW the Defendant Mark Hall by and through his attorney of record 
William B. Parsons III and moves the above entitled Court to vacate the 
existing Order appointing a Receiver in the existing mortgage foreclosure 
proceeding. A Receiver may be appointed only after judgment to dispose of 
the property according to judgment or to perserve it from waste or damage 
durinq the pendancy of an appeal, neither of which exists presently or in the 
alternative may be appointed when the mortgaged property is endanger of being 
materially injured or when the property is probably insufficient to discharge 
the mortgage debt. Neither of those instances exist in this ca'Se with the 
property beinq quite capable of being handled and maintained by the mortgagor 
who is entitled to possession during the pendancy of the mortgage foreclosure 
and there being no evidence whatsoever that there is any insufficiency with 
regards to the properties capacity to discharge the dect. 
DATED this t £ day of C^od^
 f 1 9 8 6 # 
WILLIAM E. FARSOtS III 
Attorney for Defendant 
WILLIAM B. PARSONS III #2535 
Attorney at Law 
1200 University dub Building 
136 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-1300 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DI 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, 
-oOo-
BACKSTRCM FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ) 
FREDERICK T. BACKSTROM and MARY ) 
ELIZABETH BACKSTROM, General Partners ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
-vs- ) 
) 
MARK HALL, and John Does 1-10, who ) 
may claim any interest in that ) 
certain parcel of real property ) 
located in Davis County, Utah and ) 
described more particularly as ) 
follows: ) 
) 
BEGINNING on the South l ine of the ) 
State Highway, 50 feet South of the ) 
center l ine thereof, a t a point 602.42 ) 
feet South, more or less , and 1498.52 ) 
feet North 89*31' East along the South ) 
line of said Highway from the North- ) 
west corner of Section 25, Townsrup ) 
2 North, Ranqe 1 West, Salt La<e ) 
Meridian, and running thence Ncrtin N 
89°31' East 352.44 feet alonq the ) 
South line of said Highway; ther.ce 1 
South 0°54* East 643.94 feet; tnence ) 
South 89'20»30" West 361.36 feet along ) 
a l ine 40 rods North of the Soutn line ) 
of Lot 3, Block 19, North Mill Creex. ) 
Plat; thence North 0*06'30" West ) 
645.06 feet to the point of beainning ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
CDMES NOW the Defendant Mark Hall by and through his attorney of record 
William B« Parsons III and moves the above entitled Court to require the 
Receiver in the above entitled action to give an accounting of all rents 
received, payments made, and whereabouts of funds since the appointaent of 
the Receiver in the mortgage foreclosure action presently pendingc 
The Defendant further moves that the Court order that the Receiver pay 
said funds over to the Defendant as his entitlement in conformity with his 
rights as a mortgagor pending the sale and subsequent transfer of title cr 
the real property covered by this mortgage foreclosure. 
Said accounting and payment should be ordered within ten (10) days of 
the entry of said order. 
DATED this l% day of ?' ~ £ ^ * - , 1986. 
WILLIAM B. PARSONS III 
Attorney for Defendant 
In the District Court of the Second Judicial District 
IN AND FOR THE 
County of Davis, State of Utah 
BACKSTROM FAMILY LIMITED, ) RULING ON MOTIONS 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) Civil NOo 38927 
MARK HALL, ) 
Defendant. ) 
Both the plaintiffs and the defendant have filed several 
motions each. The court heard the plaintiffs' motions on October 
28, 1986, and the defendant's motions on November 12, 1936. On 
both occasions the court took the motions under advisement. The 
court now rules on the motions. 
From the defendant's view the central issue is the "one 
action" rule in foreclosing mortgages. The parties signed a 
stipulation on April 3, 1986, which was filed with the court on 
April 16, 1986. In that stipulation provision 5a provided "That 
the subject property of this action will be foreclosed and title 
to said property will be transferred to and vested in the 
Plaintiffs." Pursuant to the terms of the stipulation the court 
signed a judgment on April 29, 1986, against the defendant for 
$31,708.93. 
The defendant now argues that the one action rule requires 
the plaintiff to foreclose the property and collect its judgment 
from the sale, and then, if there is still a deficiency judgment 
to come against the defendant to collect it. Any collection 
attempts prior to following this procedure violate the one action 
rule. 
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This court does not have any problem with the one action 
rule. It is clearly the law in Utah and that law is of long 
standing. It is based on reason and fair play* However, does 
the one action rule have any part in this case at this time? 
This court does not believe that it doeSo 
A fair reading of the stipulation of April 3, 1986, clearly 
shows that it has all the essential characteristics of mutual 
contract. It is not only signed by the attorneys for both 
parties, but by the parties themselves. A review of the 
transcript of the April 29, 1986 order to shew cause shows that 
all parties and counsel so understood it- It was drawn by the 
plaintiff and was not artfully drawn. However, the intent of 
counsel and parties was clear., It was an agreement to settle the 
case. It would be settled in defendant's favor if he complied 
with paragraphs 2 and 3 of the stipulation. If not, paragraphs 5 
and 6 detail how it would be settled in plaintiff's favor. 
The stipulation was a separate agreement to terminate the 
lawsuit, one way or another, and thereby limit the losses of the 
respective parties. The one action rule does not prohibit such a 
procedure. If it were otherwise, lawsuits would be unduly 
prolonged and unduly expensive. 
The defendants motions to vacate supplemental order, to set 
aside appointment of receiver, for accounting of receiver and for 
sanctions and fees are all denied. 
The plaintiff has moved the court to appoint a receiver 
pursuant to Rule 66 of the Rules of Civil Procedure for certain 
property and business known as Valley Royal Mobile Home Park, 850 
North Main Street, Springville, Utah. It appears from the 
affidavits and documents filed with the court that the defendant 
is attempting to fraudulently dispose of his property so as to 
become judgment proof. It appears the above property may be 
transferred or allowed to 30 into default if a receiver is not 
appointed. 
-3-
The motion of the plaintiff to appoint a receiver for said 
property is granted. The plaintiff may submit the name of a 
qualified person to act as receiver, along with his 
qualifications to the court. 
The defendant, Mark Hall, is ordered to appear before the 
court on December 9, 1986, at 2:30 P. M, to answer concerning his 
property pursuant to the supplemental order. The court accepts 
the explanation of defendant's counsel as to why he failed to 
appear previously. The court orders the bench warrant recalled. 
It will not be pursued further unless the defendant fails to 
appear on December 9, 1986 at 2:30 P. M. 
The plaintiff is ordered to draw a formal order in 
accordance with this ruling. 
Dated November 19, 1986, 
BY THE COURT: 
/ 
/ I ' / <./ / / / 
• ' • ' / • , / 
/ z 
Certificate of Mailing: 
This is to certify that the undersigned mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to Daniel W. Marcum, 275 
East 200 South, Suite 150, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; Gregory P. 
Hawkins, 275 East 200 South, Suite 150, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111; and William B. Parsons, 1200 University Club Building, 136 
East South Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on November 20, 
1986. ,-. 
JCstt/f-tf Hrtt> 
Deputy Cl^rk 
DANIEL Wo MARCUM, ESQ., #2080 
VICTOR LAWRENCE, ESQ., #4492 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
275 East 200 South, Suite 150 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 359-8900 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BACKSTROM FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, 
FREDERICK T. BACKSTROM and MARY ELIZABETH 
BACKSTROM, General Partners, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
MARK HALL, and John Does 1-10, who may claim 
any interest in that certain parcel of real 
property located in Davis County, Utah and 
described more particularly as follows: 
BEGINNING on the South line of the State 
Highway, 50 feet South of the center line 
thereof, at a point 602.42 feet South, more 
or less, and 1498.52 feet North 89°31f East 
along the South line 
Northwest corner of 
North, Range 1 West, 
running thence North 
along the South line 
of said Highway from the 
Section 25, Township 2 
Salt Lake Meridian, and 
89°31' East 352.44 feet 
of said Highway; thence 
South 0e54f East 643.94 feet; thence South 
89°20'30" West 361*36 feet along a line 40 
rods North of the South line of Lot 3, Block 
19, North Mill Creek Plat; thence North 
O^Oe'SO" West 645-06 feet to the point of 
beginning. 
Defendants. 
ORDER FOR 
APPOINTM! 
OF RECET 
Civil No. 
The Court having entered its Ruling on November 19, 
appointing a Receiver for certain property in the above-en-
action now enters its Order reflecting said Ruling: 
It is, therefore, ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED as follows: 
1. That Peter H. Waldo, Esq., be and is hereby appc 
receiver of that certain property, the Valley 
Mobile Home Park located at 850 North Main St 
Springville, Utah, and described more particular: 
follows: 
PARCEL A 
BEGINNING AT A POINT 1386.66 FEET NORTH AND 714.7 
FEET WEST AND SOUTH 86° EAST 175 FEET OF THE SOUT 
QUARTER CORNER OF SECTION 28, TOWNSHIP 7 SOUTH 
RANGE 3 EAST, SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN; SAL 
POINT BEING THE SOUTH BOUNDARY OF GRANTOR'S PROPERT' 
AND THE EAST BOUNDARY OF U.S. HIGHWAY #91; THENG 
NORTH 0°10' WEST 300 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 86" EAST 10< 
FEET; THENCE SOUTH 0°10' EAST 300 FEET TO THE S0UT1 
BOUNDARY OF GRANTOR'S PROPERTY; THENCE NORTH 86 
WEST 100 FEET TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
PARCEL B 
COMMENCING SOUTH 86° EAST ALONG THE GRANTOR'S 
SOUTHERLY FENCE LINE 275.62 FEET FROM THE 
INTERSECTION OF SAID FENCE LINE AND THE EAST 
BOUNDARY OF U.S. HIGHWAY 91, SPRINGVILLE, UTAH, 
NORTH 1386.66 FEET AND WEST 714.78 FEET AND SOUTJ-
86° EAST 275.62 FEET FROM THE SOUTH QUARTER CORNEF 
OF SECTION 28, TOWNSHIP 7 SOUTH, RANGE 3 EAST, SALT 
LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN; THFNCE NOP.T'-: O'lC WEST 
PARALLEL WITH SAID KIC;-.;A7 3r-."OAFY 540.52 FEET ; 
THENCE NORTH 80c22' EAST 306.63 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 
17° EAST 196.10 FEET TO FENCE LINE; THENCE SOUTH 
68*54' WEST ALONG FENCE LINE 66 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 
0° 01.5 FEET WEST ALONG FENCE LINE 424.20 FEET TO 
SAID SOUTHERLY FENCE LINE; THENCE NORTH 86° WEST 
ALONG SAID SOUTHERLY FENCE LINE 292.98 FEET TO 
BEGINNING. 
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ALSO A RIGHT OF WAY OVER AND TITLE TO THE FOLLOWING 
DESCRIBED PROPERTY: 
COMMENCING NORTH 0°10f WEST ALONG THE EAST BOUNDARY 
OF U.S, HIGHWAY 91; 350 FEET FROM THE INTERSECTION 
OF SAID HIGHWAY BOUNDARY THE GRANTOR?S SOUTHERLY 
FENCE LINE; THENCE NORTH 1386.66 FEET AND WEST 
714 .78 FEET AND NORTH 0°10' WEST 350 FEET FROM THE 
SOUTH QUARTER CORNER OF SECTION 28, TOWNSHIP 7 
SOUTH, RANGE 3 EAST, SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN; 
THENCE NORTH 89°50' EAST 275 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 
0e10s EAST 50 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 89° 50* WEST 275 
FEET; THENCE NORTH 0°10' WEST 50 FEET TO BEGINNING* 
That the said receiver forthwith file with the cler^ 
this court a bond in the sum of $ \ 
sureties to be approved by the court, conditioned 1 
he will well and truly perform the duties of his ofi 
and duly account for all moneys and properties which 
come into his hands and abide by and perform all th: 
which he shall be directed to do. 
That until the further order of this Court, the : 
receiver be and he hereby is authorized forthwith" 
take and have complete and exclusive conti 
possession, and custody cf all assets and sub; 
property. 
That the said Defendant and any persons acting under 
direction shall upon presentation cf a certified cop 
this order deliver to the receiver any and 
properties of the Defendant, real or personal, in t 
possession or under their control relating to 
property and that all persons are enjoined from in 
-3-
way disturbing the possessions of the receiver and 
prosecuting any actions which affect said property. 
That the receiver be and he hereby is authoriz* 
continue, manage, and operate the business assoc 
with said property until the full order of this C 
with full authority to carry on, manage, and operat 
said business, to buy and sell merchandise, supplie 
stock in trade for cash or on credit and as iru 
deemed advisable by such receiver. 
That the receiver be and he hereby is authorized i: 
discretion to employ such managers, agents, emplo 
servants, accountants, and attorneys as may in 
judgment be advisable or necessary in the manage] 
conduct, control, or custody of the affairs of 
property and of the assets thereof, and that 
receiver be and he hereby ' :.• :. vi:-:-,. izcd to m ^;<e 
payments and disbursements as may be needful and p] 
for the preservation of said property including 
authority to make payments of debts entitles 
priority. 
That said receiver be and he hereby is authorize 
receive and collect any and all sums of money du 
owing regarding said property in any manner whatsos 
whether the same are now due or shall hereafter be 
due and payable, and said receiver be and he hereb 
authorized to do such things and enter into 
agreements in connection with the management, care, 
preservation of said property as he may deem advisa 
and is authorized to incur such expenses and make 
disbursements as may in his judgment be advisable 
necessary in connection with the care, preservation, 
maintenance of the said properties. 
That the said receiver be and he is hereby authorize 
institute, prosecute, and defend, compromise, adj 
intervene in or become rr.riy to such actions 
proceedings in state or federal courts as may in 
opinion be necessary or proper for the protect 
maintenance, and preservation of said property or 
carrying out of the terms of this order, and likewis 
defend, compromise, or adjust or otherwise dispos* 
any or all actions or proceedings instituted against 
as receiver or against the said property and alsc 
appear in and conduct the defense of any suit or ad 
or compromise any actions or proceedings now pendin 
any court by or against said property where 
prosecution, defense, or other disposition of 
actions or proceedings will in the judgment of the 
receiver be advisable or proper for the protectioi 
said property. 
That said receiver after receiving monthly rents 
the tenants, and after paying all expenses and ma 
such disbursements as may, in his judgment, be advis 
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or necessary in connection with the care, preserval 
and maintenance of the said properties, is authorize 
deliver to Plaintiffs any remaining proceeds t 
applied towards satisfaction of Plaintiffs' Judc 
against Defendant Mark Hall* 
10. That said receiver is further authorized to effe 
sale of said property and to thereupon surrender 
monies received to Plaintiffs to be applied to^  
satisfaction of Plaintiffs:' Judgment against Defer 
Mark Hall. Any monies received from said sale above 
beyond the amount of Plaintiff's Judgment wil; 
delivered to Defendant Mark Hall. 
11. That said receiver is to receive a reason 
compensation of Fifty Dollars ($50) per hour subjec 
the approval of the Court for his work as receiver. 
DATED this day of ______ , 19 
THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS L. CORNABY 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Nominatio 
Affidavit, ani Or^.&r few th^ Ar»vr' ntmen »• *"T Receiver was ha 
delivered to the following on this (Ldf^ day 
v<? u£^ /?^>r_ / 19 f C? / &nd that the same wi 
V 
be submitted for the Judge's signature pursuant to Rule 2„9 
the Rules of Practice in the absence of any proper objections: 
William "Brad" Parsons, III 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
WILLIAM B. PARSONS I I I #2535 
At torney a t Law 
1200 University Club Building 
136 East South Temple 
Sal t Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-1300 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OXKT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS OOUOTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-oOo-
BACKSTSOM FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP 
FREDERICK T. BACKSTROM and MARY 
ELIZABETH BACKSTROM, General Partners 
P l a i n t i f f s r 
- v s -
MARK HALL, and John Does 1-10, who 
may claim any i n t e r e s t in tha t 
ce r ta in parcel of rea l property 
located in Davis County, Utah, and 
described more pa r t i cu l a r ly as 
follows: 
BEGINNING on the South l i ne cf the 
State Highway, 50 feet South of the 
center l i ne thereof, a t a point 602.42 
feet South, more or l e s s , and 1498.52 
feet North 89*31• East alone the South 
l ine of said Highway frcn the North-
west corner of Section 25, Township 
2 North, Ranae i West, Sal t Lake 
Meridian, and running thence North 
89°31f East 352.44 feet along the 
South l ine of said Highway; thence 
South 0°54f East 643.94 fee t ; thence 
South 89#20f30" West 361.36 feet along 
a l ine 40 rods North of the South l ine 
of Lot 3 , Block 19, North Mill Creek 
P la t ; thence North 0#06?30n West 
645.06 feet t o the point of beginning 
OBJECTION TO ORDER FOR 
APPOINTMENT OF RECEIVER 
!89' 
Defendants. 
ODMES NOW the Defendant Mark Hall by and through h is at torney of record 
William B. Parsons I I I and objects to the appointment of a receiver and asks 
for a rehearing r e l a t i ve t o the appointment of a receiver in the above 
e n t i t l e d matter on the following bas i s : 
lo At the time of the hearing of the Ex Parte Motion, counsel for the 
Defendant Mark Hall was presented the aff idavi t upon which P l a in t i f f s r e l i ed 
as t he i r bas is for the appointment or." a receiver . No prior presentat ion of 
the a f f idav i t had been made, no opportunity for presentat ion was afordec 
Defendant or Defendant's counsel per taining to the issues for appointment of 
a receiver and the Court has entered a rul ing on tune motions dated the 19th 
of November 1986/ without granting the Defendant an opportunity to present 
testimony, opposing memoranda or a f f idav i t s r e l a t i ve to the appointment of a 
receiver . The Defendant objected t c the conducting of an ex parte hearing 
and the Court having granted th i s procedural s tep has ef fec t ive ly avoided the 
Defendant's r igh t to h i s day m court concerning the issue of an appointment 
of a rece iver . 
2. The real property that the receiver has been sought for i s real 
property tha t has been t i t l e d in the name of Collin Morris, an individual and 
resident of the S ta te of Utah, according to the best information and the 
bel ief of Defendant's counsel, Collin Morris was not served with any notice 
even though he as record t i t l e holder has given notice to the world of his 
claim of ownership, Collin Mcrr-j -a~ not subject tc the ju r i sd ic t ion of the 
Second Jud ic i a l D i s t r i c t Court r . :r.e time of the ex parte hearing seeking 
the appointment of a receiver and i s not new subject to the ju r i sd i c t ion of 
the Second Jud ic i a l D i s t r i c t Court in tha t he has not been served in any 
formal proceedings there in . The effect of the rul ing on the Motions on 
November 19, 1986, and the Order for appointment of receiver as proposed by 
P l a in t i f f s 1 counsel would be in effect quiet ing t i t l e to real property in 
rJtah County in the hands of a receiver against persons claiming an in t e re s t 
there in without bringing then before the ju r i sd ic t ion of trie court or giving 
then notice of the existancc of anv proceedings. This abrogation of 
s ta tu tory law pertaining to quiet t i t l e i s markedly akin to the P l a in t i f f s 
abroqation of the s t a t u t e s and law pertaining to the one act ion rule and the 
mortgage foreclosure, 
3 . The Court by i t s rul ing on the motions has denied Mark Hall of h i s 
s t a tu to ry redemption period, has denied Mark Hall of his r igh t to bid a t a 
sa le of the real property, has placed Mark Hall in a posi t ion where the 
P l a i n t i f f s have sought in the pest and have indicated to Defendant's counsel 
tha t they wi l l seek in the future continuing judgments for the col lec t ion of 
sums steming frcm an obl igat ion a r i s ing out of a t ransact ion secured by rea l 
property without engaging in a mortgage foreclosure and with the fu l l intent 
of continuing to seek money jud-xents to 'oe col lected aaainst other a s se t s of 
the Defendant. 
4 . The proposed order the aproi'^tm.or.t cf • : .o:-iv->- :n thr: tentn 
paragraph thereof seeks tc crant the receiver th.? - : .rr — ••?!! 'uv: : e c 
property and pay proceeds of t r e sale to P l a i n t i f f s . Peoer/ers are not 
appointed to s e l l property and py. proceeds t c jud-.T*:nt c red i to r s . Peceivers 
are appointed to perserve asset:; . 
5. At the time of the hearing the P l a i n t i f f s argued tha t the property 
was subject to l o s s , waste or des t ruc t ion , and tha t a receiver was necessary 
to keep the property from being l o s t because the f i r s t mortgage had not been 
paid. This was not t rue and not un t i l af ter the hearing did the Defendant's 
counsel learn t ha t the f i r s t mcrtqaoe had t^een paid by Collin Morris and tha t 
there i s no danger of any foreclosure proceeding on the property. This 
misrepresentat ion was probably inadvertent out i t never the l e s s was a 
misrepresentat ion of the actual facts and shows why the tx parte hearing 
acted as a sham on the Court and voijed the Defendant's r i g h t s . I t i s clear 
to Defendant's counsel tha t if there i s no threa t of a mortgage foreclosure 
tha t the P l a i n t i f f s can execute tr.eir judgment in accordance with the ru les 
of c i v i l procedure against a l l property belonging to the judgnent debtor and 
tha t the appointment of the receive: has been sought by the P l a i n t i f f s to 
avoid the i r procedural and c iv i l r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . 
6. Mark Hall has indicated tc me that he was not served with a 
Supplemental Order. I asked the Court to examine the return of service which 
I a l so sha l l do to verify the au thent ic i ty of the service . 
7. Attached hereto ycu wil l :md a l e t t e r dated Ncer.ber 26, 19 36, 
del ivered to mv off ice , I car only presume as ?.n vcr of int imidation. T see 
in t h i s November 26, 1986, le^.^r that t re :: ; : . • :.•-. V fc "n-
Defendant i s not e n t i t l e d to tr.e retrest-ntatior; of O.:JT;O O^IU ...^t i : 
counsel i s t o represent the "• :'• r .unt that the Defendant may not pay said 
counsel. This attempt i s one t^ -ho lowest attempts b\ opposing counsel that 
t h i s a t torney has ever seen :n j.m >: :o r t to intimidate the opposition. I 
have no in tent ion of cowing dcvn to the a t tacks of P l a in t i f f s 1 counsel as the 
attorney for the Defendant and respectful ly request t h i s Court issue an order 
of contempt aqainst Mr. Marcum and h i s associate for attempting to intervene 
in the attorney-client p r iv i l ege . I did in my af f idavi t cer t i fy that Mr. 
Hall had paid me $3,500.00 and I was paid $3,500.00 but Mr. Hall has not paid 
tha t money fran h i s account but rather I have been paid by Mr. Ha l l ' s mother 
and father fran the i r own account in Oklahoma. They have done th i s because 
they do not l ike seeing the i r son being taken advantage of and they want an 
attorney to represent him. I was not present a t any conversation indicat ing 
tha t t h i s was a loan to Mr. Hall out I presume Mr. Hall wi l l repay his 
parents a t some point . Even if I had been paid by Mr. Hall I would r e s i s t 
any attempts by the P l a i n t i f f s to force a regurging of any funds paid for my 
serv ices . 
I respectful ly request the Court s t r ike i t s rul ing on the appointment 
of a receiver and require the P l a in t i f f s to follow the rules of c i v i l 
procedure in t he i r co l lec t ion procedures through s h e r i f f ' s sa le and 
execution. I respectful ly request the Cc^rt recons: ier i t s ruling on the 
app l i cab i l i t y of the one act ion r^ .e bet in the event th-j- Court does net 
choose to do so, I request the Court recognize the :>;• /e.v..*;> ;;.. ..uojecti.-c 
a l l in teres ted p a r t i e s to the proper form of action and to cne ju r i sd ic t ion 
of the Court before terminating any t i t l e i n t e re s t they may have. I 
respectful ly request an Order granting Mark Hall the pr ivi lege and r ight tc 
h i re any at torney through any means a t his disposal and request that the 
Court examine careful ly the return of service on the Supplemental Order to 
verify i t s au then t i c i ty . I respectful ly object to the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law in tha t they are not founded upon the rul ing on the 
motions of November 19, 1986, nor fact. 
DATED this 2nd day of December, 1986. 
' * L. 
WILLIAM Bo PARSONS III 
Attorney for Defendant Mark Hall 
HAaLPSLIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that a true and correct a. cv cf ths above and f-
going Objection was hand delivered thi^ 2nd day ~f IX- \T. xr, L.'--'1', :.J: 
Daniel W. Marcum 
Attorney at Law 
275 East 200 South #150 ^ ] n 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
J^ri Gay Cartjr, Secretary 
I 
LAW OFFICE 
DANIEL W. MARCUM. J .D . . LL.M. 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
PRACTICE CONCENTRATES IN 
THE LAW OF TAXATION 
November 2b, :/06 
HAND DELIVERED 
Mr, William B. Parsons, III 
University Club Building 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Re: Backstrom v. Hall; Civil No. 38927 
Dear Brad: 
Since Judge Cornaby has ruled completely in our clients' 
favor, several items must be addressed. 
You stated in your Affidavit of Counsel on file with the 
court that you were paid S3, 500 by Vr. Hul. for purposes c c 
that this was exempt property of Mr. Hall, and. of course, -> 1 1 
parties were aware that Mr. Hall was tr.en and continues to be 
subject to the Court's Order not to dispose of any non-exempt 
property. At the time y.r. Hall paid you this sum, he was subject 
to the Supplemental Order, and you were fully aware of it. Mr. 
Hall had no right to pay this money to you, and we believe that a 
very strong argument can be made that you, as an officer of the 
Court, had an obligation not to accept anything from him which 
William B. Parsons, III, Esq. 
November 26, 1986 
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would have the appearance of helping him to violate the Court's 
Ordero Accordingly, we make demand for immediate payment of 
$3,500 to the Backstrom Family Limited Partnership. To protect 
our clients interest, a Writ of Garnishment is being served on 
you. If you want us to go through the futile and embarrassing 
step of having a constable serve this on you, please notify me 
immediately and we will comply with your wishes. Here, as 
always, we want to be cooperative to insure that the system 
operates smoothly and with a minimum of procedural difficulty. 
Accordingly, if you have good case law (not like the Lehi State 
Bank case which was actually superseded by the Utah_ Mortgage case 
we cited) or even good secondary authority why you are not 
subject to garnishment or payment to' the Backstrom Family Limited 
Partnership, please furnish it to us ard we will, of course, 
study and consider it carefully with a view to withdrawing the 
Writ of Garnishment. 
As you can see from Judge Cornaby's ruling, the legal 
exercise of addressing the one action rule has done nothing 
except increase costs and attorneys' fees (for which Mr. Hall is 
liable) and establish the existence of fraudulent intent and 
conveyances on the part of Mr. Hall. 
After the receiver has been named for the Valley Royal 
Mobile Home Park, we will move to set aside Mr. Hall's other 
fraudulent conveyances, including, but not limited to, the Robert 
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E. Lee Apartments in Provo, Utah, and the sale of the home in 
Mapleton, Utah. We will also seek the appointment of a receiver 
for said properties. We will try to have these Motions also 
heard on December 9, 1986. 
In light of Judge Cornaby's very clear ruling, any further 
attempts by Mr. Hall to transfer property will only incriminate 
him in the worst possiti^ way. It wilL increase our fees and 
costs for which he will be liacle. 
At the Hearing on rocember 9, 1986, we will demand a 
detailed accounting for ov-ry financial transaction vr. Hall has 
engaged in since April 3, l'*-}6. We derna.ia uhat he produce copies 
of all checks or receipts jiven or- received and or other evidence 
of each transaction since April 3, 1986, together with all 
documents evidencing any transfer of real or personal property 
since April 3, 1986. We specifically demand production of all 
documents prepared by any title company relating to the transfer 
of the Robert E. Lee Apartments, including documents which may 
have been prepared but not ultimately used. Of course, we will 
pay reasonable copying expenses. Our Subpoena Duces Tecum for 
such documents to be pre : .ceJ before Judge Cornaby on December 9, 
1986, will be forthcoming. 
We will further ir.sist that all testimony at ihis Hearing 
be taken before the Judge and transcribed. Therefore, it will 
save everyone time and rrrrey if Mr. Hall and you will agree to 
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have all documents in my office for review and ccpying no later 
than December 5, 1986, at noon. We ask that you so agree. 
Otherwise we will be forced to go through all of the documents 
piece by piece on the record before the Jud-^ e —obvic AS ly a long. 
expensive and completely avoidable process. We do net thin* the 
Judge would like to sit through it either, which is why we want 
it very clear on the record that we are trying to get you and Mr. 
Hall to avoid this tedi us and unnecessary action. If vr. Hall 
does not comply, we will bring our request to avoid this problem 
to the Judge's attention, as a basis for sanctions. 
We respectfully ask that you immediately discuss with your 
client the benefits of settlement versus the additional costs and 
attorneys5 fees that he will undoubtedly incur, if he persists in 
these fruitless attempts to avoid his obligations to our clients. 
We would like to have the entire matter closed by December 
4, 1986, so we could avoid the Hearing and the time- and expense 
in preparing for it. Of course, we have kept detailed time and 
expense records and are prepared to substantiate them by 
Affidavit, all in accordance with the Judgment en file. We must 
make it clear, however, that--in view of the difficulty thot vr. 
Hall has caused--our clients will not, repeat not, settle for 
anything less than f_u_l_l payment including all costs and all 
attorney's fees to the date of payment. 
William B. Parsons, III, Esq-
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Please contact us immediately if you wish to discuss this 
matter further. Thank ycu very much. 
Very tpuly yours, 
/Victor/Lawrence 
VLrmtk 
cc: Fred Backstrom 
illiam B. Parsons, III, Esq, 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was hand 
delivered to the following this - day of ?/[• - a *> 'f/.'•; , 
19 >~C : 
William E ^arsons, III, Esq. 
136 East . .-th Tempi- Suite 1200 
Salt Lake Citv. UT 8-4111 
/ 
WILLIAM B. PARSONS III #2535 
Attorney at Law 
1200 University Club Building 
136 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-1300 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND PCR DPC7IS CCTNTY, 7TATF. "-F ,\H 
-oOo-
BACKSTOOM FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ) 
FREDERICK T. BACKSTROM and MARY 
ELIZABETH BACKSTROM, General P a r t n e r s ) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
-vs- ) 
MARK HALL, and John Does 1-10, who ) 
may claim any in t e r e s t in tha t ) 
ce r ta in parcel of rea l property ) 
located in Davis County. Utah and ) 
described more pa r t i cu la r ly as ) 
follows: ) 
BEEINNIJE on the South l ine of the } 
State Highway, 50 feet South cf the ) 
center l ine thereof, a t a point 602*42 ) 
feet South, more or l e s s , and 1498.52 ) 
feet North 89^31f East along the South ) Civil No. 38927 
l ine of said Highway from the North- ) 
v;est corner of Section 25, Township ) 
2 North, Range 1 West, Sal t Lake ) 
Meridian, and running thence North ) 
89 '31 ! East 352.44 feet along the 
South l i ne of said Highway; thenoe 
South 0°54f East 643.94 fee t ; z~er.ce ) 
South 89*20'30" West 361.36 feet along \ 
a l i ne 40 rods North of the South l ine , 
of Lot 3, Block 19, North Mill Creek ) 
P la t ; thence North 0oC6'30" We^t 
645.06 feet to the point of beginning ] 
) . . 
Defendants . ) 
MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE 
ORDER AND MOTION PCR A 
RECONSIDERATION OF RULING 
ON M3TIONS/NO/EMBER 19, 
1986 
GOMES NOW the Defendant Mark Hall by and through h is at torney of record 
William Be Parsons I I I and requests the Court reconsider the rul ing on the 
Motions dated Novesnber 19, 1986, under the provisions of Rule 54(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure* 
Ihe Defendant further requests the entry of a Protect ive Order allowing 
the Defendant the opportunity cf re ta ining counsel and l i t i g a t i n g a l l causes 
of act ion and forms of re l ie f .>.»tf*>ni a rv ropr ia te . 
Counsel for Defendant surx : L J 3 J Exhibit "A,v to t h i s Moticn for 
Protect ive Order a l e t t e r recei \ - i :>ay^>:: 2, 1°86, whi>v. on i t s face 
appears to be an attempt to i n t i r u i a t e counsel by threatening sanctions under 
Rule 11 for the prosecution c: r c i endan t ' s clairrs. 
RESPECTFJLLY SUBMITTED th i s day of _ _ _ _ , 1986. 
WILLIAM B. PARSONS I I I 
Attorney for Defendant 
HAMD DELIVERY CERTIFICATE, 
I do hereby ce r t i fy tha t a true and correct cepv of the aoove and fore-
going Motion was hand del ivered th i s . 0 _ day of Wf.C t/aJLfo _ r 1986. 
t c : 
Daniel Mar cum 
Attorney a t Law 
275 East 200 South #150 
Sa l t Lake City, Utah 84111 J 
Jiri Cay CarterrSecretaty 
LJVW OFFICE 
DANIEL W. MARCUM. O.D.. LL.M. 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
PRACTICE CONCENTRATES IN 
THE LAW O F TAXATION 
&> <f~W A<P y^i. yi*/+ /S0 •J&JLLSfay. WUM/// 
8 0 1 3 6 9 - 8 9 0 0 
December 2, 1986 
HAND DELIVERED 
Mr. William B. Parsons, III 
University Club Building 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Re: Backstrom v. Hall; Telephone conversation of December 
2, 1986 
Dear Brad: 
This letter is to confirm our telephone conversation 
earlier today. It is our understanding that you will accept 
service for all documents in regard to the above-referenced case, 
specifically, our Writ of Garnishment naming you as Garnishee end 
our Subpoena Duces Tecum, both of which hav- tec." r-r^-red to : r. 
previous correspondence and discussed today. Copies of ro':h 
documents are enclosed. 
It is further our understanding that you are not willing 
to approve as to form our Order for the Appointment of a 
Receiver. Your main objection is that the Valley Royal Mobile 
Home Park has not been subject to foreclosure inasmuch as Mr. 
Hall had actually paid any late mortgage payment shortly before 
the Ex-Parte Hearing of October 28, 1986. You are pursuing this 
course of action even though the other evidence of Mr. Hall's 
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fraudulent conveyances was presented to Judge Cornaby and was 
uncontroverted; and even though Judge Cornaby's Ruling 
specifically found that, based upon the "affidavits and documents 
filed with the court that the Defendant is attempting to 
fraudulently dispose of his property so as to become judgment 
proof." This was surely a sound basis for the appointment of a 
Receiver under Rule 66. Careful research oi' ?:;:»•» ?r will show 
that it does not matter that the property may be in t,ne "name of 
Collin Morris. A receiver may still be appointed. 
Let me emphasize once again that even a cursory review of 
the facts, evidence, and transcripts of the records shows clearly 
that Mr* Hall is willfully trying to hinder, defraud, and delay 
our clients as judgment creditors. Our documentary evidence was 
duly and timely served; it was uncontroverted —even by Mr, Hall 
and/or you at the Hearing even though Mr. Marcum read from Lyle 
Duncan's Affidavit, and even though Mr. Hall was sitting at 
Counsel table with you and could have been called as a rebuttal 
witness. I cannot help but think that the Judge will think that 
your planned actions are even further evidence of bad faith. I 
trust you have informed Mr. Hall of this and other dangers. 
During our telephone conversation, I took copious notes, 
and when I suggested that we were only trying to resolve this 
matter once and for all, you stated that you, in fact, are nc^ r 
trying to terminate it. You stated that you are filing a 
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counterclaim in the Fourth District immediately against our 
clients. You stated that you are going to file a Chapter 11 
Bankruptcy proceeding and bring ir a-i-'er>- : • o^im- in r«n 
effort to readdress your contentions. You seated further that 
you are filing an appeal of Judge Cornaby's Ruling and that no 
matter whether right or wrong, you are nevertheless going to tie 
up Mr. Hall's property for months to come. 
We respectfully ask that you reconsider your stated 
intended course of action. Please review the affidavits on 
file, our memoranda, and the transcripts of the Hearings thus 
far. It is clear that a receiver was not sought solely on the 
basis that Mr. Hall was behind in his payment on the Valley Royal 
Mobile Home Park and, therefore, was subjecting the property to 
foreclosure. In light of the overwhelming evidence establishing 
Mr. Hall's fraudulent acts, we view all future action as being 
effected with the specific intent to willfully hinder, delay, and 
defraud our clients. There is no good basis for an appeal and no 
good basis for you pursuing any further acticn in th • Fourth 
District. The record, and oven tne »r.i:.j;: ..^ cs o: tr.e Hearings 
before Judge Cornaby, are literally plastered with your 
representations that the Fourth and Second Districts had 
"concurrent jurisdiction." Further, our mutual letters establish 
that we would not pursue that action in the Fourth District until 
the issue—raised by you--of the one action rule was addressed by 
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Judge Cornaby. With deference, I must say that it now looks like 
since you lost before Judge Cornaby, that you are now judge/forum 
shopping, I hesitate to suggest it, but we urge you to 
thoroughly research your positions before you proceed, and, 
please advise Mr. Hall that if he loses (which is probable 
considering how rarely District Courts are reversed in this 
State) he will be increasing not only your fees, -but also ours. 
Brad, this continued litigation is needless, costly, burdensome, 
and not supportable under Rule 11. We feel impelled, therefore, 
to notify you and Mr. Hall that we will seek appropriate 
sanctions against you personally and against Mr. Hall under Rule 
11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (URCP). I feel you should so 
advise Mr. Hall. 
We anxiously await your reply. 
Very truly yours, 
. / / ^ 
»* , *"' '/ ^ "— 
/Victor/Lawrence 
/ 
/ 
/ 
VL:mtk 
Enclosures: Writ of Garnishment 
Subpoena Duces Tecum 
cc: Fred Backstrom 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing letter and 
enclosures, the Writ of Garnishment and Subpoena Duces Tecum, was 
hand delivered to the foil iwn.j this _ __r> __ __ day of 
Williar 5. Parsons, III, Esq. 
136 East Jouth Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
• • / ; 
DANIEL Wc MARCUM, ESQ,, #2080 
VICTOR LAWRENCE, ESQ., #4492 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
275 East 200 South, Suite 150 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 359-8900 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BACKSTROM FAMILY LIMITED 
FREDERICK T- BACKSTROM and 
BACKSTROM, General Partners, 
PARTNERSHIP, 
MARY ELIZABETH 
MARK HALL, and John Does 1-10, who may claim 
any interest in that certain parcel of real 
property located in Davis County, Utah and 
described more particularly as follows: 
BEGINNING on the South line of the State 
Highway, 50 feet South of the center line 
thereof, at a point 602.42 feet South, more 
or less, and 1498-52 feet North 89°31' East 
along the South line 
Northwest corner of 
North, Range 1 West, 
running thence North 
along the South line 
of said Highway from the 
Section 25, Township 2 
Salt Lake Meridian, and 
89°31f East 352.44 feet 
of said Highway; thence 
South 0°54' East 643.94 feet; thence South 
89c20'30" West 361.36 feet along a line 40 
rods North of the South line of Lot 3, Block 
19, North Mill Creek Plat; thence North 
0°06f30M West 645. C6 feet to the point of 
beginning. 
INTER: 
ORDEI 
Civil No, 
Defendants. 
Pursuant to its own Ruling rendered on November 19, 1986 
regard to the above-entitled action, the Court ordered Defen 
Mark Hall to appear on December 9, 1986, to answer quest 
concerning his property pursuant to a supplemental order. 
On December 9, 1986, Daniel W. Marcum and Victor Lawr 
appeared as legal counsel for and on behalf of the Plainti 
The Defendant Mark Hall appeared in person and was represente 
William B. Parsons, 111, Esq. Also present was Collin Mor 
He was also represented by William Bo Parsons, 111. Co 
Morris also submitted himself to the jurisdiction of this Cou 
Plaintiffs asked the Court to approve their nomination f 
receiver for the Valley Royal Mobile Home Park in Springvi 
Utah, as requested in the aforementioned Ruling. Defen 
opposed such approval. Defendant had also submitted sev 
motions. The Court heard oral argument on those motions, 
then took the matters under advisement. 
The Parties recognized that rents are now due in regarc 
the Valley Royal Mobile Home Paik and several tenants i 
concerned about to whom rents should be paid, and this pro' 
was presented to the Court. After discussion, the part 
entered into an agreement in open Court as follows: 
1. Collin Morris herewith submits himself to 
jurisdiction of the Court. 
2. Rents from the tenants of the Valley Royal Mobile 1 
Park are to be paid to Collin Morris. 
3. Collin Morris is to pay all rents from Valley R 
Mobile Home Park to Attorney William Bo Parsons, III 
be deposited in said attorney's Trust Account* 
4. Attorney William B. Parsons, III, will pay on a cur 
basis the first mortgage payment for the Valley R< 
Mobile Home Park. Said payment is to be made to 
Robert Howard. 
5. William B. Parsons, III, is to pay all necessary d 
(utilities, garbage, etc. owing to the City 
Springville ) . All remaining sums will be held in 
Trust Account of William B. Parsons, III, until fur 
order of this Court. 
The Parties asked the Court to enter an Interim 0 
accordingly* Therefore, based upon the Agreement of the part 
the Court now enters the following Interim Order. 
It is now ADJUDGED, ORDERED and DECREED as follows: 
1. Until this court has had the opportunity to review 
decide pending motions, all rents due from the ten 
of the Valley Royal Mobile Homo ?ar> in Sprir.^vi 
Utah are to be paid tc Coll:-; >'{ * : 
2. Collin Morris is to deposit those rents into the t 
account of William B. Parsons, III, Esq. Mr. Parson 
the attorney of record for the Defendant Mark Hall 
Collin Morris. 
-3-
3. Collin Morris submits himself to this Coun 
jurisdiction and this Court now has jurisdiction o 
Collin Morris. 
4. Mr, Parsons is to pay the existing mortgage payment 
all necessary debts (utilities, garbage, etc., owing 
the City of Springville). Mr. Parsons will hold 
remaining sums in his trust account. 
5. This Interim Order will continue until further Order 
the Court. 
DATED this day of , 19 . 
THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS L. CCRNABY 
Approved as to Form and Content: 
~^ 
t i : i^ : . - * 
WILLIAM B. PARSONS, III 
Attorney for Defendant and 
Attorney for Collin Morris 
PtftflEL 
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In the District Court of the Second Judicial District 
IN AND FOR THE 
County of Davis, State of Utah 
BACKSTROM FAMILY LIMITED > RULING ON MOTIONS 
PARTNERSHIP, 
Plaintiff, Civil No. 38927 
) 
VS . y 
MARK HALL, ET AL, A 
Defendant.
 N 
A hearing was held c. ""ect-mber 9, 19^6 fcr the ourpose of 
hearing motions of both parties. Daniel W. Marcum and Victor 
Lawrence appeared as ccur.se 1 fcr the plaintiff, and William B. 
Parsons III appeared as counsel for the defendant. After oral 
argument the court took the motions under advisement. 
Counsel for the defendant, Mr. Parsons, agreed to voluntar-
ily make Collin Marris a party to this lawsuit and to represent 
him herein. Mr. Collin Morris was personally present in court 
and agreed to voluntarily subject himself to the jurisdiction 
of this court and to have Mr. Parson represent him. Mr. Collin 
Morris and all parties and all attorney's agreed that Mr. Morris 
w•.••-:Id continue to collect the rents from the Valley Royal Mobil-? 
Hc-'-e Park and pay all of such rents and ether park income to 
'::':?. attorney, Mr. Parse:.:". Mr. Parsons ••;: ' 1 he1 ' such ronios 
tr. his tr^s*: account u*- fjrth*vr r v ; >.•, - •••/..- v.* '-~ may pry 
•>.-<; ssary park expenses : "" as Jnr;:\-v: ". I^j City arc the -purchase 
money mortgage. The crurt will allow the defendants to have 
a hearing wherein it will be the burden of the plaintiff-to prove 
that the defendant, Mark Hall, has an interest in such mobile 
Backstrom vs. Hall 
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home park. The court will set a trial date as soon as either 
counsel indicate he is prepared for the hearing. 
The plaintiff has moved the court to impose a $5,000 
Rule // sanction against defendant's attorney, Mr. Parsons. The 
motion is denied. At this point, Mr. Parsons appears to be de-
fending his client, Mark Hall, in good faith. One complaint had 
to do with the attorney fee. It is a common practice to say 
my client, so and so, has paid me for legal services, when in 
fact someone else has actually paid the fee to the attorney. 
The court does not find deceit in this. When forced to explain 
whore the fee actually c?.r.e from, Mr. Parsons did so, The court 
is satisfied with Mr. Parsons' explanations. He is not rr-
cu i red to answer *" n° —"r ' * a r n" *"*^  - -*•>-• - - - »•,..'.. 
T h e p l a i n t i f f a l s o c o m p l a i n s a b o u t th»j c e : o a a a n t , M a r k 
Hall, and his threat ui 1 -ankruptcy. There is nothing improper 
about this. If Mr. Hall thinks he qualified for bankruptcy re-
lief then he has a right to say so and then follow it up with the 
actual filing. If he is wrong, the bankruptcy court will tell 
:v. m so. 
The plaintiff also complains about the defendant's motion 
•"••or a rehearing, motion to vacate supplemental order, motion to 
ccmpel sale, and other motions. There is nothing improper about 
-'••.-.•so motions. Mr. Parsons has a valid argument about the one 
u" on rule. The fact that this court does not agree with him 
•l.os not affect the validity of his arguement. This court recoc-
n:2es that an appeal court could reasonably agree with his argu-
Backstrom vs0 Hall 
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ment. There is no bad faith in strongly representing his posi-
tion before the court. Many a ball game has been won in the 
final seconds when the opposing team thinks the game is over 
in their favor. 
The court will next ,:rect its attention to the defendant's 
motion for a rehearing on ; no on^ ac* .. o-: ru '-•. •'- - - rourt ha.-- no 
objection to rehearings m appropriate cas-js. Ruling?: mace in 
the haste of crowded calendars and hard fought contested cases 
sometimes need additional thought and consideration. Why mak<» 
the appellate court correct something that the trial court would 
like to correct? True, judges don't often change their own rul-
ings, and true, judges may often be in error, yet never in doubt, 
but this does not mean a rehearing is not a good tool on occasion. 
This court has rethought :ts position in this case and is still 
convinced that it has made the right decision. The motion for 
a rehearing is denied. 
Defendant's counsel has asked the court to verify service 
c: the supplemental order on Mark Hall. The return of service 
shows that Mark Hail was personally served a copy of the orcier 
en August 19, 1986 at 275 East 2CC Soutn, Suit- 150, Salt Lake 
i ty, Utah, by Martha '". Kirk. It ?.'?•:;•:••>•• pr:rv:. TY-- ^ oir; 
v. . " ". cr.ee aaain order h^>- defendant, Mirk !:all, to appenr be-
:\e-j the court on December 30, 1986 at L : 3 C P.M. to be questioned 
by plaintiff's counsel on that order. 
Counsel for the defendant has asked the court to inform 
him the day the appeal time begins. Today is that day. The 
Backstrom vs. Hall 
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court has signed the previous order submitted by counsel for 
the plaintiff today. 
The plaintiff's motions to strike objections to Order for 
Appointment of Receiver is denied. The court has previously 
indicated in this opinion that a hearing will be held* The plain-
tiff's Order for the Appointment of a Receiver is being filed 
unsigned. Any further orders concerning this subject will a-
wa;t the hearing. 
The plaintiff's motion to strike the defendants motion for 
a protective order is granted. Counsel should assume each is 
intelligent and acting in good faith on behalf of their respec-
tive clients. 
The plaintiff is orciorod to draw a formal order of the court 
cased upon this ruling. 
Dated December 12, '9C.6. 
• P y T '-r £ c 0r T R ^  : 
/ 
z~ / 
JUDGE 
Certificate of mailing 
I hereby certify that the undersigned has mailed a true 
snd correct copy of the cibove Ruling to Daniel W. Marcum and 
Victor Lawrence 275 East 200 South,~Suite 150, Salt Lake City, 
:tah, 84111 and William 5. Parsons, III 136 East South Temole, 
\-..:t Lake City, UT 34111 on December 15, 1936. 
DANIEL W. MARCUM, ESQ., #2080 
VICTOR LAWRENCE, ESQ., #4492 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
275 East 200 South, Suite 150 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 359-69CJ 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BACKSTROM FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, 
FREDERICK T. BACKSTROM and MARY ELIZABETH 
BACKSTROM, General Partners, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
MARK HALL, and John Does 1-10, who may claim 
any interest in that certain parcel of real 
property located in Davis County, Utah and 
described more particularly as follows: 
BEGINNING on the South line of the State 
Highway, 50 feet South of the center line 
thereof, at a point 602.42 feot South, more 
or less, and 1498.52 fevt North IP "21' Fast 
along the South lir.o of said H'^hway :':••'- ~-.•? 
Northwest corner of Section 2b, "K.-. ni.~ 
North, Range 1 Weft, Salt Lake Yei . :ii an, and 
running thence North &9c3i, East 3L2.44 feet 
along the South line cf said Highway; thence 
South 0C54' East 643.94 feet; thence South 
89c20'30" West 361.36 feet along a line 40 
rods North of the South line of Lot 3, Block 
19, North Mill Creek Plat; thence North 
0c06f30" West 645.06 feet to the point of 
beginning. 
OPDER 
Civil 
Defendants. 
This Court ordered the above-mentioned Defendant, Mark Ha 
to appear on December 9, 1986, to answer questions concerning 
property pursuant to the Supplemental Order presently on i 
with the Court and further pursuant to this Court's own Rul 
rendered on November 19, 1986c 
Doniel W. Marcum and Victor Lawrence appeared as counsel 
the Plaintiffs. D-i^ndant Mark Hall appeared in person and 
represented by his counsel, William B. Parsons, III. 
Counsel for the D»-:end«nt, Mr. Parsons, agreed to voluntar 
make Collin Morris a ;" -rty to This lawsuit and to represent 
herein. Mr. C* i: .?, "»i:in was p«-rsorrily pre^o:if in louit 
agreed to volunt-ai .'. y t jbiect hinself to the jurisdiction of t 
court and to hdv- M: . K-.rron? represent hin. Mr. Collin Mcrr 
Mark Hall and all attorneys agreed that Mr. Morris would 
allowed to collect the rents from the Vai >-v Royal Motile H 
Park and pay all noits and other park income ' • his attorney, 
Parsons. Mr. Parsons agreed to hold suci >i.<>nies in his tr 
account until fuifh^r order of the Court, ex -opt he agreed to 
necessary park expenses, such as the expenses to Springville C 
and the purchase money mortgage. This agreement was reflected 
an* Interim Order previously entered by this court. 
Various motions were submitted to the Court. The Court 
not have opportur.it/ to review the ame, ar\ci therefore, he-
oral argument on * hv> various mot i. as and then took the matt 
under advisement. 
Ruling on December 12, 
premises, now enters its 
It is now ADJUDGED, ORDERED and PR.CRFF^ r.~ f••->! ^  rv.—: 
1. Following the terms of the Interim Order on file 
this Court, Collin Morris is to continue to collec 
rents from the Valley Royal Mobile Home Park and pa 
rent proceeds and other park income to his attc 
William B. Paisons, III. Mr. Parsons is to hol< 
account for such monies in his trust account 
further order of this Court, except he is tc 
necessary park expenses (utilities, garbage, etc., 
to the City of Springville) and the purchase i 
mortgage. 
2. A hearing is to be scheduled to determine whether o 
Mark Hall has any interest in the Valley Royal M< 
Home Park located in Springville, Utah. The Court 
set a trial date as scon as counsel for either pa: 
indicates he is prepared for such. 
3. Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions is denied. 
4. Plaintiffs' Objections to Defendant's Motion f 
Rehearing, to Vacate Supplemental Order, to Compel 5 
etc. are also denied. 
The Court having entered its 
after being fully advised in the 
reflecting said Ruling. 
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Defendant's Motion for a Rehearing or Reconsideratior 
the one action rule is denied* 
The personal service of the Supplemental Order on N 
Hall is proper and the Defendant, Mark Hall, 
therefore, once again ordered to appear before t 
Court on December 30, 1986, at 2:30 p.m., to 
questioned by Plaintiffs' Counsel on that Order. 
The time period allowed for the Defendant to appeal t 
Court's decision to deny his motions to Compel Sale, 
Vacate Supplement -i 1 Order, to Set Aside Appointment 
Receiver, fcr Accounting of Receiver and for Sancti 
and Fees, began running on the date this Court's Rul 
was rendered, namely, December 12, 1986. This Court 
signed the previous Order submitted by Counsel for 
Plaintiffs on that day, that is on December 12, 1986. 
The Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Objections to Order 
Appointment of Receiver is denied. 
The Plaintiffs' Order for the Appointment of a Recei 
is hereby filed unsigned. Any further orders concerr 
this subject will await the aforementioned hearing. 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Defendant's Motion fo: 
Protective Order is granted. 
-4-
] j 11. Counsel for both parties are to assume each Intel 
2 \ \ and acting in good faith on behalf of their resj 
3 clients. 
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DATED this day of , 19 
THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS L. CORNA 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Order was 
i .'" ; V delivered to the following on this \ V. ~ da 
\ i V ( ;.' _• ~~ _, 19 *?'h and that the 
will be submitted for the Judge's signature pursuant to Rule 
of the Rules of Practice in the absence of any proper object] 
William "Brad" Parsons, III 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Secretary 
-5-
WILLIAM B. PARSCNS III #2535 
Attorney at Law 
1200 University Club Building 
136 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-1300 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT dXJRT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-oOo-
BACKSTROM FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ) 
FREDERICK T . BACKSTROM and MARY ) 
ELIZABETH BACKSTHDM, G e n e r a l P a r t n e r s ) 
Pla in t i f fs? ) 
.)• NOTICE OF APPEAL 
- v s - ) 
MARK HALL, and John Does 1-1C, who •) 
may claim any i n t e r e s t in tha t ) 
ce r ta in parcel of r ea l property } 
located in Davis County, Utah and ) 
described more pa r t i cu l a r ly as ) 
follows: ) 
BEGINNING on the South l i ne of the ) 
State Highwayr 50 feet South of the ) 
center l i ne thereof, a t a point 602.42 ) 
feet South, more or l e s s , anc 1498,52 ) 
fee t North 89°31f East along the South ) Civi l No, 38927 
l ine of said Highway from the North- ) 
west corner of Section 25, Township ) 
2 North, Range 1 West, Sa l t Lake } 
Meridian, and running thence North ) 
S g ^ l 1 East 352.44 feet along the ) 
South l i n e of said Highway; thence ) 
South 0°54f East 643.94 fee t ; thence ) 
South 89J20 f30" Wfest 361.36 feet along ) 
a l i ne 40 rods North of the South l i ne ) 
of Lot 3 , Block 19, North Mill Creek ) 
P l a t ; thence North 0fi06f3Q" West ) 
645.06 fee t t o the point of beginning ) 
Defendants. 
Notice i s hereby given that Defendant, Mark Hall, above named, hereby 
appeals to the Supreme Court of the s ta te of Utah frcro the Ruling on Motions 
entered in th is action on the 12th day of December, 1986, by judge Douglas L< 
Cornaby. 
DAIED this 9th day of January, 1987. 
WILLIAM B. PARSONS I I I 
Attorney for Defendant 
HAKD DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that a true and correct ^opy of the above and fore-
going Notice of Appeal was hand delivered this 9th day of January, 1987, to : 
Daniel w. Marcum 
Victor Lawrence 
Attorneys a t Law 
275 East 200 South #150 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
" - ' * ' - ' ' ^ -
Secretary 
Ad 
ay c£ri 
WILLIAM B. PARSCNS III #2535 
Attorney at Law 
1200 University Club Building 
136 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-1300 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FCR DAVIS COUOTY, STATE OF UTAH 
- o O o -
BACKSTOOM FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP 
FREDERICK T. BACRSTBOM and MARY 
ELIZABETH BACKSTROM, General Partners 
Plaintiffs/Respondent, 
-vs -
MARK HALL, and John Does 1-10, who 
may claim any interest in that 
certain parcel of real property 
located in Davis County, Utah and 
described more particularly as 
follows: 
BBGINNDG on the South line of the 
State Highway, 50 feet South of the 
center l ine thereof, a t a point 602.42 
feet South, more or less , and 1498.52 
feet North 89*31' East along the South 
line of said Highway from the North-
west corner of Section 25, Township 
2 North. Range 1 West, Salt Lake 
Meridian, and running thence North 
89°31f East 352*44 feet along the 
South l ine of said Highway; thence 
South 0°54f East 643.94 feet; thence 
South 89#20'30" West 361.36 feet along 
a line 40 rods North of the South line 
of Lot 3, Block 19, North Mill Creek 
Plat; thence North 0°06f30" West 
645.06 feet to the point of beginning 
REQUEST FOR TRANSCRIPTS 
Civil No. 38927 
Defendants/Appellants. 
COMES NCW the Defendant/Appellant and hereby requests that the 
transcripts of the hearing on April 29, 1986, the hearing on November 19, 
1986 and the hearing on December 9, 1986, be prepared and filed with the 
Qerk of the above entitled Court as provided by Rule 12(a) of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. 
DATED this 9th day of January, 1987. 
K)S^ lb> 4 £t^ -~&~*j> f.\ l' 
WILLIAM B. PARSONS III 
Attorney fcr Defendant/Appellant 
1200 University Club Building 
136 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telechone: (801) 364-1300 
HP&D DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and fore-
going Designation of Record on Appeal was hand delivered this 9th day of 
January, 1987, to: 
Daniel w. Marcum 
Victor Lawrence 
Attorneys at Law 
275 East 200 South #150 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 (\ ») C j 
J?ti Gay Carter, Secretary 
WILLIAM B. PARSONS III #2535 
Attorney at Law 
1200 University Club Building 
136 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone; (801) 364-1300 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT O0URT 
IN AND FOR DN/JS COUNTY, STATE OF OTAH 
-oOo-
BACKSTRCM FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ) 
FREDERICK T. BACKSTROM and MARY ) 
ELIZABETH BACKSTRDM, General Partners ) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) DESIGNATION OF REO0RD 
-vs- ) CN APPEAL 
MARK HALL, and John Does 1-10, who ) 
may claim any interest in that ) 
certain parcel of real property ) 
located in Davis County, Utah and ) 
described more particularly as ) 
follows: ) 
BEGINNING on the South line of the ) 
State Highway, 50 feet South of the ) 
center line thereof, at a point 602.42 ) 
feet South, more or less, and 1498,52 ) 
feet North 89°31f East along the South ) Civil No. 38927 
line of said Highway from the North- ) 
west corner of Section 25, Township ) 
2 North, Range 1 Wtest, Salt Lake ) 
Meridian, and running thence North ) 
89°318 East 352.44 feet along the ) 
South line of said Highway; thence ) 
South 0*54' East 643.94 feet; thence ) 
South 89*20'30" Wtest 361.36 feet along ) 
a line 40 rods North of the South line ) 
of Lot 3, Block 19, North Mill Creek ) 
Plat; thence North 0*06f30" West ) 
645.06 feet to the point of beginning ) 
Defendants. 
TO THE CLERK OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DAVIS 
(XXJOTY, STATE OF UTAH* 
With reference to the Notice of Appeal filed in the above act ' )n cy 
Defendant Mark Hall, you are hereby required to prepare, certify and t r a n s i t 
to the Suprane Court of the State of i tan the record and the whole thereof of 
th is matter. 
The records as requested ..r. _ : >o carpiete m a l l respectsF prepared 
and transnitted as required by low and the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
the Rules of Federal Procedure, and should be properly pagenanted as required 
by said rule . 
DATED this 9th day of January, 1987. 
' \ 
i - •' • ' i } — 
WILLIAM B. PARSONS III 
Attorney for Defendant 
HAND DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I do rtereby certify rhzr 3 trx zrd correct ^ 7 / cf rhe :.:c:c ?.r.z -fore-
going Designation of Record on Appeal was hand delivered this 9th day of 
January, 1987, to: 
Daniel w. Marcum 
Victor Lawrence 
Attorneys at Law 
275 East 200 South #150 A 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
J9fi Glay Career, Secretary 
